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“The Internet is not a good thing,  
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This thesis analyzes how Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) have          
been introduced in rural regions of Colombia for peacebuilding purposes and strengthening            
democracy, and how these have had an impact on the aesthetic practices of local communities.               
This research discusses theories about the relationship between technology and society, and it             
provides a critical perspective from the idea that technology solves social problems. Case studies              
of ICTs projects from the Soviet Union, Estonia, France, Finland, Chile and Paraguay are              
introduced and examined, to give an account of how similar processes took place in different               
contexts. Two case studies from Colombia are analyzed (Vive Digital and Linternet), and             
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I write this research based on a personal interest in social and political changes that               
Colombia, my home country, has faced since the 2010s. This South American nation has been               
characterized by social struggles, political instability, violence, war on drugs, and the uprising of              
left-wing guerrilla and right-wing paramilitary groups since the second half of the 20th century.              
These problems are still present today, but since the 2010s certain changes and situations opened               
new opportunities, especially the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Government and FARC            
(the country’s oldest guerrilla force). Previous attempts to achieve and consolidate peace            
agreements have failed in the past, and the one from 2016 is the most successful so far.                 
Colombia is experiencing a slow transition into a post-conflict society where reconciliation must             
prevail over hate. My motivation with this research is to contribute with a critical view of the                 
implementation and usage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for          
peacebuilding purposes.  
It is not the intention of this thesis to explain, nor analyze, the legislative and military                
aspects that lead to the 2016 Peace Agreement, or the present political division between those               
who defend it and those who want to make severe modifications. This research examines the               
social dimension of how technology was introduced, what was the original discourse and the              
actual state, and how communities rejected or appropriated the new tools. The Digital Culture              
discipline is key to this research as it provides tools for studying societies that use ICTs for                 
transformation, and feeds theories and critical perspectives for a better understanding of the             
relationship between society and technology. 
This thesis is divided into the following eight chapters: ​(1)Introduction, ​(2) Literature            
Review, (3)Methodology, (4)ICTs Socio-Political Institutions​: ​The Soviet Union, ​Estonia,         
France and Finland, (5)Democracy, Education and ICTs in Latin America: Chile and            
Paraguay ​(6)ICTs and peacebuilding in Colombia​, ​(7)Analysis and presentation of findings           
and (8)Conclusion​. The theoretical ground for the discussion is built on the first chapter, where               
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the research question and key terms are introduced. Relevant literature is presented in the second               
chapter, giving an insight of theories and ideas that other scholars have built and used when                
analyzing similar topics. The research methodology is discussed in the third chapter.            
Socio-political aspects of ICTs are analyzed in the fourth chapter, and examples from The Soviet               
Union, Estonia, France, and Finland are brought forward. The fifth chapter provides a historical              
account of how ICTs were introduced and expanded for democratic and educational purposes in              
Latin America, but most importantly: how these were resisted. The sixth chapter introduces             
Colombian case studies, with an overview of recent policies, peacebuilding initiatives, and local             
projects. The final analysis and presentation of findings are shared in the seventh chapter, and the                
conclusion is given in the eighth chapter.  
This thesis is written by having in mind those who want to learn about projects that                
address social issues through the expansion of ICTs networks. It is intended for researchers              
within academia that have similar fields of study, as well as for non-expert readers that want to                 
gain more knowledge and learn from theories that study the relationship between technology and              
society. Policy makers can also find this thesis useful, as it provides cues and suggestions about                
the characteristics that make ICTs projects perform better in social environments. Last, but not              
least, I thank the support of Scott Rettberg, my thesis supervisor, who guided and encouraged me                
throughout this whole process. His feedback was of great value for organizing the arguments and               















Technology is never neutral. It is intertwined with and influenced by cultural, social, and              
political dimensions. This thesis builds upon theories and approaches that highlight the            
importance of the social and cultural aspects when analyzing and studying technology.            
Especially, because this research focuses on what it is not traditionally considered a developed              
western country: Colombia. This South American country is very slowly coming out of an              
internal armed conflict that has lasted for over 50 years, and ICTs have been introduced over the                 
last few years in rural communities to promote democracy and reduce poverty. This thesis              
analyzes this phenomenon by answering the following research question: ​How have the            
expansion of ICTs and peacebuilding strategies been combined in Colombia since the 2010s?             
And how have peripheral communities ​appropriated the new tools to foster their aesthetic             
practices? ​But before tackling this question some considerations regarding technology and           
society must be presented. 
The great majority of present-day technological design and developments come from           
western countries, especially when it comes to computation. Some were initially developed for             
warfare purposes and popularized later when civilians were included as end-users. Benjamin            
Peters, Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Tulsa,             
claims that: ‘Military and computing innovations were inseparable in the early history of             
computing’ (2016, 83). He also points out that computer innovations and other technological             
products (like sensors, GPS and Velcro) accelerated when introduced into nonmilitary industries            
(2016, 83). Since the 1950s western markets dictate how technology is directed and sold to the                
public, and how some developments are favored with constant upgrades and newer versions or              
thrown into oblivion if marketing strategies are not fulfilled. Research, development and mass             




One example of these issues is the Internet. First developments date back to the United               
States’ military strategies during the Cold War, where a decentralized network of command that              
could resist and react to a nuclear strike was funded by the Department of Defense (the result of                  
such a project was called ARPANET). Alexander Galloway, ​professor of Media, Culture, and             
Communication at New York University, points out that the origins of the Internet have been               
debated, but what is clear is that ‘it was built to withstand a nuclear attack’ (2016, 29). He points                   
out that an attack as such is very centralized, so a non-centralized network solution as the                
ARPANET was needed (2016, 29). Cold War tension pushed the development of such             
information infrastructure. Benjamins Peters even points out that Soviet authorities were actually            
the ones that ‘set into motion the events that led to the ARPANET’ (Peters, 2016, 92), as their                  
leading position in space, rocket and nuclear research posed a threat for the American              
counterpart. The Soviets managed to enforce fear by putting Sputnik into orbit, as nuclear              
warheads on artificial satellites were a threat that Americans considered possible (2016, 92).             
However, not all voices agree that ARPANET and the network that resulted from it was built                
originally for withstanding possible nuclear attacks. Some historians that have studied the            
Internet have claimed that this idea is a ‘false rumor’ (Leiner et alt., 1997, 2). They explain that                  
the emphasis on ‘robustness and survivability’ came actually at later stages (2). 
The Internet’s further developments were boosted when academic institutions and          
research centers were included in the following decades. In 1989, Tim Berners Lee wrote the               
first HTML protocols and URI schemes for the World Wide Web at CERN (the European               
Organization for Nuclear Research) to improve and facilitate the sharing of scientific data. His              
goal was to create a set of conventions that would allow scientists to communicate and exchange                
information with their peers over the Internet (1999, 29). However, ‘early users were largely              
homogenous in terms of their demographic: young, white, male, Western, largely from            
middle-class socio-demographics’ (Galloway, ​2006, ​29). Initial users shared many         
characteristics, and early developments and products were made to fit their needs and demands.  
This is still the case today, where the proficiency to understand and develop for the               
Internet and the World Wide Web is still limited to a few compared to the vast amount of people                   
that use and browse it (Galloway, ​2006, ​29). Alexander Galloway points out that the ones in                
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charge of establishing Internet standards belong to a ​‘​self-selected oligarchy of scientists’ that             
are part of a ‘relatively homogenous social class’ that operate in relatively close locations (2006,               
123)​. However, this could be seen just as a practical consequence of how the Internet is                
developed and consumed, as most users just want the networks to work and are not really                
worried about the protocols or the code behind them (2006, 123). Nevertheless, this             
technological niche has created problems that are visible nowadays as, for example, very few              
users have a real understanding of how information is obtained, collected and presented on such               
networks, and even on how to check their authority (Bauchspies, Restivo, and Croissant, 2006,              
5).  
It is unfair to criticize the fact that the Internet was developed by a reduced number of                 
scientists that worked together in a given organization and country; this is the result of social,                
political and economical reasons. What is troubling is that protocols and services that are              
developed nowadays still depend on needs and demands from a narrow group, that are then               
expanded and imposed upon users around the globe. One problematic example from this is              
“internet.org”, an initiative that is promoted by Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg. On the             
project's website it is explained that ‘Internet.org is a Facebook-led initiative with the goal of               
bringing internet access and the benefits of connectivity to the portion of the world that doesn’t                
have them’ (Internet.org, 2020). The social media company’s strategy for achieving this is to              
partner with mobile operators in countries where mobile data coverage is expensive and scarce,              
in order to offer a service called “Free Basics”. This consists of an app that provides access to                  
websites, information and other applications for free. However, it is possible to find dubious              
traits of this project when looking beyond the altruistic ideas. For example, internet.org is              
actually ‘an enclosed digital domain that does not benefit the poor so much as it pads Facebook’s                 
bottom line’ (Karr, 13, 2015). The users do not receive much benefit for accessing information               
when compared to the power that Facebook earns when harvesting the data of millions of new                
users (13, 2015). Internet.org does not advocate for Net Neutrality, but rather benefits sites and               
platforms that meet Facebook’s standards and criteria (15, 2015). This project imposes and             
pushes a closed system upon users (without them even being aware of it), which is ultimately                
more beneficial to the ones developing the protocols and services. It is not a transparent               
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initiative. It creates the idea that social networks are equivalent to the Internet, or even further:                
that Facebook is the Internet. 
Cultural aspects are not traditionally taken into account when building, spreading and            
even studying technology, especially when it comes to non-western countries. However, it can be              
utopic to develop technology by taking into account the vast number of different cultures around               
the world. Nowadays, companies create products on a massive scale (and for as many users as                
possible), in a globalized market where technology is designed and produced in different             
locations and consequently shipped and sold around the world. Nonetheless, this way of             
production and consumption should not be taken for granted. Cultural and social traits must be               
contemplated in the discussion, in order to have a critical understanding of technology and              
society.  
On the design level new innovative methodologies regarding usability, universal design           
and accessibility are now added during the prototyping and designing processes of new             
technological products. Kat Holmes, inclusive design expert that has worked in companies like             
Google and Microsoft, claims that ‘these moments of technological transition are the ideal times              
to introduce inclusive design’ (Holmes, 2018, 138). Technology has the potential to reach more              
and more users nowadays, so different usability challenges that users face must be considered              
and solved to provide better services and experiences. Physical, mental and cultural traits are              
analyzed in order to avoid decisions based on biased opinions regarding ‘gender, race, ethnicity              
income, sexual orientation, and age’ (2018, 80). A similar approach is needed when discussing              










The Digital Culture discipline is relevant to analyze technology and society matters, as it              
provides inclusive and diverse theories regarding the development, production and consumption           
of technology within society. This chapter presents the following ideas and concepts that are              
discussed within this field, and that are useful for this research: technoscience, the technological              
other, the concept of progress, peacebuilding and ICT4D. 
 
Technoscience 
The term Technoscience first appeared in literature in the late 1970s, and it was initially               
used to address the ‘complexity of interacting and mutually stimulating scientific practices and             
technologies’ (Andreev and Butyrin, 2011, 75). The Belgian philosopher Hottois was the one             
who coined the term (Kastenhofer and Schwarz, 2011, 61). This initially referred exclusively to              
the impact that exact sciences had on the production of technology. However, more recent              
approaches recognize that technological projects contain social prescriptions (Andreev and          
Butyrin, 2011, 75), reason for which social sciences were added to the discussion. Since the               
2000s several scholars started to ​‘​focus on the cultural and material dimensions of             
technoscience’ (2011, 75), and social perspectives slowly became equally important as the            
scientific ones. Technology was framed before as a black-box, so social questions came at the               
end when analyzing issues regarding risks and impact (Macnaghten, Kearnes, and Wynne, 2005,             
269). The updated Technoscience version reverses this, as it highlights that: 
 
(...)social sciences should be an actor in technological progress. It should play a              
strategic role in the analytical provision of important aspects, such as development            
control, legal regulation, the projecting of adequate social institutions, and the creation of             





The Technoscience concept seeks to include and acknowledge social and cultural aspects             
in the study of science and technology. ​The scholars that have nourished and expanded this term                
claim that cultural and social dimensions have been historically ignored when studying science             
and technology. The former were disregarded as they cannot be scientifically quantified, whereas             
the latter can be measured and evaluated under the scientific method based on facts (which leave                
no room for sociological explanations). The Technoscience ​approach opposes this divided           
approach. It studies the social components that surround science and technology, like the social              
institutions that allow certain developments to flourish or disappear, the reasons why certain             
economic groups make investments in them, and how marketing and private interest have an              
impact on their distribution and expansion.  
Bauchspies, Croissant and Restivo are three interdisciplinary scholars who apply a           
sociological perspective to Science and Technology Studies (STS). Their book ‘Science,           
technology, and society: A sociological approach’ (2006) is an example of this. These academics              
use the term Technoscience ​to acknowledge the ‘complex socio-cultural webs of sciences and             
technologies’ (Bauchspies, Croissant and Restivo, 2006, 102)​, ​as they strive to point out that              
technology is always framed and molded by social and cultural contexts. They stress the              
importance of implementing a more critical approach regarding social aspects, as a better and              
more complete comprehension and understanding of science and technology can be achieved            
(2006, 111). They claim that science and technology ‘can and should be considered as social               
institutions’ (Bauchspies, Restivo, and Croissant, 2006, 10), and not as independent disciplines            
that are foreign to cultural elements.  
It is ​recognized within Technoscience that social and power structure varies over periods             
and locations, meaning that the relationship between technology and society is never static.             
Bauchspies, Croissant and Restivo use the concept to ‘highlight how technology affects social             
relationships, how social relationships affect technology, and how these change over time and             
space’ ​(2006, 9). According to this, each context and culture crafts a ‘technological             
reconstruction’ ​(2006, 82)​, as users in specific locations can start giving different usages and              
purposes to technology, regardless of the intentions of policymakers, marketers and even            
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designers (2006, 82). Another crucial aspect within this concept is the analysis of how certain               
developments and devices are modified and rejected by cultural groups. These previous angles             
are highly relevant for this research, as they help to better understand technology’s role in a                
specific context (Bauchspies, Restivo, and Croissant, 2006, 23).  
New perspectives and ideas about gender and race have also nourished the Technoscience             
discussion in recent years. For example, Cecilia Åsberg, Professor of STS at KTH Royal              
Institute of Technology in Stockholm, and Nina Lykke, Professor Emerita of Gender Studies at              
Linkoping University, point out that the Feminist Technoscience approach has revealed ‘ways in             
which gender, in its intersections with other sociocultural power differentials and identity            
markers, is entangled in natural, medical and technical sciences as well as in the sociotechnical               
networks and practices of a globalized world’(Åsberg and Lykke, 2010, 299). 
Technoscience ​keeps evolving as new questions and needs come forward. This concept is             
borrowed for this research due to all the previous reasons, and it is expanded in chapter 7. 
 
The technological other 
Until this point the terms western societies, periphery, and the idea of the other have                
been mentioned. But to what do these refer to exactly? What and where are the western                
societies? What and where is the periphery? What and where is the center? Is it just a                 
geographical reference? Or is it embedded with cultural references? From which point of view or               
perspective can or should words and concepts like these be used? Are these already outdated for                
the discussion regarding technology and society as they are embedded with stereotypes and             
hidden layers of meaning? And last but not least, who is the other?  
This thesis opened with a strong statement, pointing out that a great number of              
computational technologies come from western countries (and the Internet was used as an             
example). This geographical limitation traditionally refers to national states such as Canada,            
France, Germany, the UK, and the USA, and it can also be related to 19th-century colonial                
European powers. However, one good place to start to clarify the discussion of what a western                
country is and what the others are ​is by revisiting the Introduction and Chapter 1 of Edward                 
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Said’s book “Orientalism” (2003), where he analyzes how the east was constructed to define the               
west.  
According to Said, many authors have accepted and assimilated the division between “the             
Orient” and “the Occident” to start building theories (2003, 10), but such broad division can lead                
to misconceptions and superficial analysis. For example, he explains that what European powers             
have defined as ‘the Orient’ ​is radically different to the definition made by North Americans (US                
and Canada), as the latter associate it with the Far East (China and Japan) (2003, 9). The author                  
describes as well that colonial powers crafted the idea and the discourse of “Orientalism” in               
‘dominating, restructuring and having authority’ ​(2003, 11) over the orient. Said’s intention with             
his book is to point out that the “orient other” ​is not a simple term that encapsulates just one                   
geographical region. It actually encompasses a ‘network of interests’ (2003, 11) that helped             
‘European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort                 
of surrogate and even underground self’ ​(2003, 11)​. ​Colonial powers were successful not only to               
exercise control, but also to define themselves by creating an external image of “the other”. Such                
divisions between Orient and Occident are not natural, but are cultural constructions (2003, 12).  
Said's ideas of the Orient and authority can be compared as well to ICTs and their                
protocols, as the latter are also apparatus of power that are spread over the world. The days                 
where western political and social structures exercised control based on theory and institutions             
are fading out, as technological developments based on western markets and needs are reaching              
all the corners of the globe. Alexander Galloway explores these issues in his book ‘Protocol:               
How control exists after decentralization’ (2003) and sets the Internet as an example. He claims               
that ‘the Internet is deceptive’ (60), as it is presented by many as a decentralized structure that                 
transfers information in a free and democratic fashion (60). Galloway opposes such a way of               
understanding the Internet as he explains that the Web is actually ‘structured around rigid              
protocols that govern the transfer and representation of texts and images’ (61). He stresses the               
fact that the Internet is not as open as it appears to be, because it is actually a ‘highly                   
sophisticated system of rules and regulations (protocols)’ (69). Galloway recognized that the            
Internet has no ‘centralized administrator or control’ (138), but this does not mean that there is a                 
lack of authority imposing regulations. He claims that the Internet is controlled by the protocols               
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which are established by organizations like the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), that             
ultimately ‘represent the power and authority of millions of developers, researchers and users’             
(138). Both the concept of ‘the Orient’ and the protocols are set to control and impose authority,                 
and thus limit the freedom of subjects or users. 
However, the apparent hegemony of western technological supremacy must be taken with            
a grain of salt, because the cultural aspects must be also considered. Such leadership did not                
happen out of the blue, as there are several reasons for which western societies are in the                 
technological front. American historian Lewis Mumford explores the cultural reasons that made            
possible such dominance in chapter 1 of his book ‘Technics and Civilization’ (2010), as he               
explains preliminary periods and phenomena:  
 
To understand the dominating role played by technics in modern civilizations, one            
must explore in detail the preliminary period of ideological and social preparation. Not             
merely must one explain the existence of the new mechanical instruments: one must             
explain the culture that was ready to use them and profit by them so extensively (2010, 4). 
 
Mumford approach is a predecessor of the Technoscience ​approach, because he strives to             
explain the cultural reasons and social structures that gave Western European countries a             
technological boost, despite other cultures (like the Chinese and the Arabs) having the same              
initial instruments to do so (2010, 4). His interest in having a historical and cultural approach is                 
based on his criticism of other writers of his time, who considered the ‘machine age’ (2010, 4) as                  
novelty and ‘recent phenomenon’ (2010, 4)​. This is for him a baseless argument as ‘for the last                 
three thousand years (...) machines have been an essential part of our older technical heritage’               
(2010, 4)​. Mumford's cultural approach provides a perspective of how there were changes that              
prepared certain societies to be ready for technological revolutions, rather than just focusing on              
the moment when they happened. 
The American historian explains that several cultural characteristics prepared Western          
societies to take advantage of the new technological developments, in order to become the              
frontrunners. For example, the measurement of time and space (with the clock and perspective),              
the influence of capitalism, and the increase of interest in the natural world rather than the                
heavenly one. The reason for bringing Mumford into the discussion is to highlight the              
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importance of understanding the culture where technology develops, rather than taking for            
granted that technological changes happen outside society; or that certain societies are naturally             
more technologically developed or gifted than others. 
In this thesis the concept of western societies follows geographical borders, meaning that             
it encompasses Canada, USA and Europe. However, it is considered throughout the discussion             
that this idea is a cultural construction, especially because such localized technological            
dominance will not withstand for long. There are new players that are blurring the hegemony.               
China and India have, for example, caught up with the race and are dominating local and foreign                 
technological markets. These geographical divisions do bring along embedded stereotypes and           
hidden layers of meaning, but these are addressed and clarified along this research.  
The intention here is to have a critical approach to how the development of ICTs is                
localized and then globalized. The west-east discussion is also brought to the fore to debate the                
idea of center-periphery, where the west is considered as the center and the east as the periphery.                 
The aim of having this analysis lies in the fact that Colombia, as a South American nation with a                   
history of colonization, does not fit into those categories. It could be argued that this country                
receives more western influence due to its proximity to the US, but it is neither west nor east, or                   
precisely center nor periphery. Colombia could be considered as a middle income country that is               
aligned with and influenced by western standards. Nonetheless, within the country there are             
certain hubs (like the two largest cities: Bogotá and Medellín) where most of the ICTs are                
centralized. This means that internally there are centers and peripheries (in plural), being the              
cities the former and the rural areas the latter. 
 
The concept of Progress 
It is commonly thought that providing access to technology is in itself a good thing.               
Modern social and political institutions have successfully crafted an idea of certainty around             
technology, where specific outcomes are assured through automation or machinery. This positive            
and altruistic approach must be reviewed as well, as many hidden cultural layers are not               
considered when trying to narrow technological gaps (and ultimately fail by ignoring them).             
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These are issues that are debated in Technoscience, as the apparent connection between             
technology and the idea of ‘inevitable progress’ ​(Bauchspies, Restivo, and Croissant, 2006, 17)             
is ​revisited. ​A critical view is applied to technological determinism, where a whole world of               
tools, devices, developments, and creations are thought to have only one possible outcome:             
progress (or alienation, if it is seen from the opposite end). This approach is shared by Sally                 
Wyatt, Professor of Digital Cultures Technology and Society Studies from Maastricht           
University, as she explains that ‘the STS community cannot simply despair of the endurance of               
technological determinism and carry on’ (2008, 169). She stresses the relevance of addressing             
and facing such issues as it is something that will not disappear. 
Bauchspies, Croissant, and Restivo refer to the concept of “Technological fix” when            
tackling the problem of technological determinism​, to debate the idea that ‘more technology, or a               
piece of hardware, will solve a social problem’ ​(2006, 83)​. The authors explain that social               
problems can be rooted in material aspects (like the lack of resources such as land and food) and                  
that technologies that are inserted to fix or solve these issues are encoded with assumptions or                
preconceived ideas (2006, 83). Madeleine Akrich, French scholar and director for the Sociology             
of Innovation at Mines ParisTech, addresses similar issues with the concept of ‘script’ (Akrich,              
1992, 208). According to her, designers and technology developers impose certain scripts or             
scenarios over objects they create, in order to limit actions and roles (214). Therefore, the               
introduction of new tools do not usually go as smoothly as planned, and large investments that                
are made do not seem to pay off. Technology in society, for Bauchspies, Croissant, and Restivo,                
should not be viewed under the lenses of “determinism” or “fixation”​, but rather as a social                
dialogue where people and communities can select the technologies that will help them achieve              
their objectives. With this in mind, they introduce the concept of ‘Technological intensification’             
(2006, 83)​, ​where ‘a social process is intensified as people select technologies which allow them               
to reach their goals’ (83).   
The examples the authors give to explain this idea are the car and telephone, specifically               
during the urbanization period in the US at the beginning of the 20th century. These two                
technologies ‘intensified’ the urbanization process, as they ‘alleviated the negative consequences           
of mobility’ (84)​. These devices did not determine or fixate the urbanization process, but rather               
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they made it easier. This means that urbanization was not caused by the new technologies of cars                 
and telephones, but the urbanization process was rather intensified by such tools. These             
examples come from a transformation that North Americans were facing at the turn of the               
century. However, is it possible to address non-western scenarios with the same concepts? Is it               
possible to talk about the intensification of peacebuilding, democracy and aesthetic practices in             
contexts facing other types of transitions? And if so, how can these processes be intensified with                
ICTs? The answers to these questions are addressed in chapter seven. 
Progress should not be seen as something neutral that societies undergo when in contact               
with technology. Progress is in itself a concept that must be tackled from different perspectives,               
and not only with positive narratives. The idea of progress does not necessarily lead towards               
improvement, as it can also bring problems that may cause stagnation, or even recoil. The               
German philosopher Walter Benjamin had a similar idea when he wrote ‘On the Concept of               
History’ (2020). He used Paul Klees’s “Angelus Novus” painting to point out what an angel of                
history would look like: ‘His face is turned towards the past. Where we see the appearance of a                  
chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble                
and hurls it before his feet’ (6)​. The angel cannot close his wings even though he wants to,                  
because a storm that is blowing from paradise is pushing him to the future. Progress, for                
Benjamin, is precisely that storm that pushes forward. This view ties the idea of progress with                
destruction, like a storm that creates catastrophes to move ahead. Progress, under this view, does               
not ensure an onward movement that goes peacefully and smoothly, as it may entail destruction               
and violence.  
The cases that are introduced in chapters fours, five and six address the problem of                
technological determinism, and explain how the introduction of technology was equated to            
progress. The political discourses behind the case studies are reviewed, and social and cultural              





The fields of Technology and Society have been seen by some as two independent              
realms, as explained before. However, disciplines like Digital Culture and theories and            
approaches such as the Technoscience seek to bridge the gaps between these two, to provide a                
holistic view of how they impact and influence each other; opposing the belief that technology is                
independent and that it determines society. This previous issue of separating two areas of              
knowledge is also present when it comes to the discussion regarding peacebuilding and ICTs, as               
these two have ‘long been viewed as separate’ (Tellidis, 2026, 75). Peacebuilding, according to              
the United Nations Security Council: 
 
is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and              
therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human           
rights programs and mechanisms. This requires short and long term actions tailored to             
address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it’ (UN,              
2001, 1).  
 
Technology is not addressed explicitly in this definition, but it is broad enough to trigger               
initial interpretations; such as that ICTs could be used as tools to support the mentioned               
programs and mechanisms and moreover that technology could be tailored based on the             
“particular needs of societies”. So, why are peacebuilding and ICTs split apart? 
Peace studies have become the core discipline when it comes to the academic analysis of               
violence, conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Johan Galtung, Norwegian sociologist and          
founding member of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), points out that Peace Studies              
must be an expanded field in order to work properly and deliver significant research, where               
methodologies and knowledge from other ‘scientific disciplines’ must be drawn into (Galtung,            
2010, 21). ​The disciplines he refers to are: Psychology, Sociology, Political Science, Economics,             
International Relations, Law, International Law and History (21). He even suggests that Peace             
Studies are the academic equivalent to Health Studies when it comes to conflict prevention and               
resolution analysis, as the latter requires further disciplines to understand the complexity of             
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human health; like for example physics, chemistry, anatomy, physiology and pathology (22).            
Galtung explains that each of the listed disciplines that enhance and foster Peace Studies is               
essential because they add elements for the pursuit of truth, as they give more tools and                
perspectives to verify and compare knowledge regarding conflicts (22).  
However, Galtung’s definition of ‘​scientific disciplines’ is limited to the Social Sciences,            
and there is no discussion regarding technology nor the rapid digitization of culture. Why is this                
so? The answer to this question can be traced back to his paper ‘Towards a New Technological                 
Order’ (1979)​. ​He points out here that technology is not neutral, as it is always accompanied by                 
defined structures that are rooted in the West (1979, 299). This idea links back to ‘The                
Technological Other’ ​section of this research. His thesis is that the protocols embedded in              
technology may perpetuate structures of inequality, and thus increase the gap between ‘center’             
and ‘periphery’ (1979, 277). These ideas can be related to other thoughts he expresses in his                
essay ‘Information, communication and their future in postmodernity’ (1998). He analyzes the            
idea of the “information society” and “information superhighway”​, ​and how there is a             
misconception of these. Information that is distributed among a network has protocols, and             
misinformation could be willingly distributed based on power structures (Galtung, 1998, 220).            
According to the Norwegian sociologist, the act of transferring structures of power and protocols              
through technology is a form of invasion which is more ‘insidious than colonialism, because              
such an invasion is not always accompanied by a physical Western presence’ (Galtung, 1979,              
288)​. ​Other researches such as Ioannis Tellidis and Stefanie Kappler have also addressed the              
danger that ICTs can pose in these scenarios, as ‘they can serve as a platform on which                 
hegemony can be promoted and existing power imbalances be reinforced, shifting the balance             
towards powerful institutions if the latter are able to strategically use ICTs as legitimating tools’               
(Tellidis & Kappler, 2016, 83).  
It may be argued Galtung does not include disciplines related to ICTs in Peace Studies as                
these embed structures and protocols that may enhance conflicts instead of cooling them.             
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that Galtung is categorically against technology. He              
is skeptical towards the idea that technology is good per se, and he actually advocates for a more                  
balanced development and distribution of technology: one that is not only directed from North to               
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South and West to East, but rather developed and transferred in both directions (Galtung, 1979,               
298). Here is precisely where the discipline of Digital Culture can play a major role, as its goals                  
and methods seek to study and analyze the cultural and social perspective of technology, rather               
than focusing solely on the techniques, mechanics and hierarchical structures. Galtung claims            
that Peace Studies needs transdisciplinarity to build more truthful accounts regarding conflicts            
and peacebuilding, hence Digital Culture can add a valuable layer for understanding how ICTs              
can affect or benefit peacebuilding initiatives. For example, the problem of ​technological            
colonization ​may be criticized with the Technoscience approach, and ideas such as            
“technological intensification”​ ​can help to counter the “technological determinism”. 
Combining tools from Digital Culture and Peace Studies is becoming urgent nowadays,            
as in the last years projects that use ICTs for peacebuilding initiatives have emerged in different                
contexts; but still, the research has been scarce (Gaskell, Larrauri, Rieken, Ali, and Rigterink,              
2016, 2). There is indeed ‘substantial literature that is being built on the role that ICTs can play                  
for destructive purposes’ (Tellidis & Kappler, 2016, 75)​, ​but not enough when it comes to               
peacebuilding. There are some important articles that address the potential that technology has             
when concerning peace, like for example “As We May Think” ​(1945). The author of this essay                
was none other than Vannevar Bush, a prominent American Scientist that served as the Director               
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during the Second World War, where he               
coordinated the work of almost six thousand American scientists in the application of science to               
warfare (Bush, 1945). He was even part of the Manhattan Project, which gave birth to the atomic                 
bomb. Bush wrote the article after the end of the war to voice his thoughts about the role of                   
science and technology in the postwar period. He explained that technology needed to serve              
other purposes rather than warfare, and it was time to empower the human mind rather than its                 
capability of destruction (Bush, 1945). In order to accomplish this goal, he envisioned a device               
that he called “The Memex”, which consisted of a desk that had an intricate system of                
microfilms that would store and retrieve data for the user. This can be thought of as a mechanical                  
version of the World Wide Web, as the principles of searching, retrieving, browsing and              
connecting data are similar. The idea behind “The Memex” illustrates a desire for how              
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technology could be applied for other purposes rather than warfare, although this device never              
saw the light of the day. 
The UN sought to address issues regarding peacebuilding and ICTs in 2001, by creating              
the “United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force” ​(UN ICT TF),            
which ran until 2006. The organization behind this pompous name intended to be a center of                
knowledge that would report, advise and give guidelines regarding ICT implementation and            
development. In 2005 Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, wrote that:  
 
ICTs can help address the root causes of violent conflict. By promoting access to              
knowledge, they can promote mutual understanding, an essential factor in conflict           
prevention and post-conflict reconciliation. ICTs also offer ways to reveal human rights            
abuses, promote transparent governance, and give people living under repressive regimes           
access to uncensored information and an outlet to air their grievances and appeal for help’               
(Stauffacher, Drake, Currion & Steinberger, 2005, iii).  
 
The Task Force’s goal was to foster society with the benefits that ICTs could offer. The                
intention was to close the gap of the Global Digital Divide (between developing and developed               
countries). Kofi Annan was aware though that ‘technology by itself is no panacea or magic               
formula'’(2005, iii|) for which ‘political will is required to respond to information, to share it               
widely and equitable, and to ensure global dissemination of ICTs’ (2005, iii|). The Task Force               
published several documents and organized round tables in a span of five years. However, the               
written form and language of such reports reflect the bureaucratic political framework they             
belong to. There are extended paragraphs praising and thanking individual members, and a lack              
of a critical point of view of technology and its cultural implications. The results of the Task                 
Force lacked real impact and long-term influence, as it produced merely informative reports with              
suggested guidelines to follow. The Task Force was replaced in 2006 with the Global Alliance               
for Information and Communication Technologies and Development (GAID) but no significant           
changes were introduced. 
Nowadays there are other organizations (that are less bureaucratic and have fewer            
committees) that focus their efforts on combining ICTs and peacebuilding. These provide            
guidelines as well but have a more critical research approach. Organizations like ICT4Peace,             
22 
 
WOSCAP and BUILD UP strive to analyze and produce knowledge from case studies where              
technology is used in conflict resolution. The content and activities that these publish and              
arrange are frequent, and they address relevant topics such as AI, cybersecurity and social media.               
Thanks to these efforts, the research field has slowly gained more practitioners in the last couple                
of years (Gaskel, Larrauri, Rieken, Ali, & Rigterink, 2016, 5). Despite the fact that these               
organizations are mainly localized in the EU, cross-national research has been added in the              
discussions, and even in the production of knowledge.  
One term that is relevant in this discussion is Information and Communication for             
Development (ICT4D), as it focuses on the use of ICT for fostering societies. Dorothea Kleine,               
Professor in the Geography Department at the University of Sheffield and Co-Director of the              
Sheffield Institute for International Development (SIID), ​points out that one relevant aspect of             
this concept is that it takes into account the ways in which ICTs can actually create more                 
divisions and new types of dependencies; rather than just focusing on possible positive outcomes              
(Kleine, 2013, 2). This approach poses a critical view on how ICT is implemented in societies                
facing changes, rather than considering that the use of technology has only favorable outcomes.              
Klein points out cases of ‘techno-optimism’ (2013, 6), where ICTs were introduced in             
developing countries so that they could match standards of developed ones. ICT4D seeks to              
oppose ideas such as “Technological Determinism” or “Technological Fix”, which were           
introduced in the “The Concept of Progress” section of this thesis.  
Kleine explains that in 2013 the ICT4D area of study was still not well defined, and not                 
enough theories were built around it (2013,1); similarly, as Gaskel, Larrauri, Rieken, Ali, and              
Rigterink did when analyzing peacebuilding and ICT. The British scholar claimed that it was              
urgent to broaden the knowledge within this field, as technology permeated daily life in many               
aspects and the ‘intellectual endeavour’ of understanding and analyzing was running behind            
(2013, 1). Scholars heard the call and established theories and methodologies (e.g. Sein, Thapa,              
Hatakka, Sæbø, De’, Pal, Sethi, Reddy and Chitre). Some recent theoretical foundations are             
established based on discussing what development actually is (Sein, Thapa, Hatakka & Sæbø,             
2018, 8). Development within ICT4D is not based on traditional and antique standards, where              
‘the west is seen as the role model and in order to develop, people and nations need to become                   
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more “western”’ (2018, 10). This outdated view claims that developing countries are in need of               
help to imitate other developed cultures, as they are not capable of advancing by themselves               
(2018, 10).  
Ideas written by Arturo Escobar, Colombian-American Professor of Anthropology at the           
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, have a great influence on the critical perspectives on               
development within ICT4D; especially from his book ‘Encountering Development: The Making           
and Unmaking of the Third World’ (2012). Escobar embarks on a similar journey as Said did                
when writing Orientalism and discussing how the Orient was built to define the West. He               
analyzes how the discourse of the Third World was established after the Second World War in                
order to define the Developed Countries. According to the Colombian author, the concept of an               
underdeveloped world revolves around ideals and values established by dominant powers after            
the war. Strategies to fight poverty were based on capitalist ideas, ‘not only to create consumers                
but to transform society by turning the poor into objects of knowledge and management’              
(Escobar, 2012, 56). He also addresses issues regarding the usage of technology under traditional              
development approaches, where it was thought that it could ‘amplify material progress’ (2012,             
67) and the ‘extension of modernist ideals’ (2012, 68). Development, and the construction of the               
Third Word, are discourses that still help developed countries to spread economic and political              
ideas. The ICT4D approach is, on the contrary, one that recognizes independent values that must               
be fostered (rather than foreign ones that are implemented). ICT4D even includes perspectives             
that center their attention on the usage of open data and education, and the non-proprietary flow                










The main goal of this thesis is to analyze how and why ICTs have been introduced in                 
rural regions of Colombia for peacebuilding purposes and strengthening democracy, and how            
these have had an impact on the aesthetic practices of local communities. Aesthetic practices are               
understood in this thesis as those expressions that refer to creations in music, literature, and               
visual and performing arts. This phenomenon has occurred in several countries. This thesis             
revises case studies where central Governments pushed for the introduction of ICTs in order to               
strengthen certain ideologies or political agendas. The selected case studies come from the Soviet              
Union, Estonia, France, Finland, Chile and Paraguay. These are chosen because they each give              
an account of how ICTs were implemented in societies that were undertaking social and political               
transitions (Estonia and Chile), how democracy and well-being are thought to be promoted and              
strengthened through ICTs projects (Finland and Paraguay), how a state perceives ICTs as             
essential for its citizens and provides tools for accessing them (France), and how poor decision               
from central authorities can affect the implementation of ICTs (Soviet Union). Different sources             
are reviewed for each case, and opposite angles are given respectively. The comparative             
approach balances the positive and negative interpretations from how the projects unfolded and             
from their results. This methodology chapter describes why and how each case is tackled. 
Connecting citizens and broadening access to ICTs is not something that only democratic             
governments seek. Researcher Peter Benjamin dives into the Soviet Union, to understand how             
the creation of a network can be affected by bureaucratic structures. In his book ‘​How not to                 
network a Nation: The uneasy History of the Soviet Internet’ ​(2016) Benjamin focuses on how               
the ideal of a connected society conflicted with the establishment. The findings of this book are                
contrasted with ‘Online in the Soviet Union’ (1991)​, ​an article written by Sergei Mayorov and               
Leonid Polyakov months before the Soviet Union collapsed. These authors, as insiders, talk             
about the wonders, benefits, and limitations of going online in their context. 
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After the restoration of independence, and the fall of the Soviet Union, the Baltic country               
of Estonia moved forward to promote and develop an electronic Government that provides its              
citizens with access to public services (as a reaction to years of communist repression).              
Nowadays the state provides 99% of its services online, 46.7% of Estonians use internet voting,               
and 98% of the citizens have an electronic ID card (E-Estonia, 2020). The country is now even                 
the first to offer e-citizenships on the Internet. Applying and receiving the Estonian e-citizenship              
does not precisely entitle the owner with the same rights as Estonian citizenship, but it promotes                
and facilitates creating companies and starting businesses. The success and reach of the Estonian              
digitization project is revised with Meelis Kitsing’s ‘Success Without Strategy: E-Government           
Development in Estonia’ (2011), with the study of the influence and impact of the European               
Union by Tomasz Szopiński and Marcin W. Staniewski ‘Manifestations of e-Government usage            
in post-communist European countries’ (2011), and with Jovana Zoroja’s ‘Internet, E-Commerce           
and E-Government: Measuring the Gap between European developed and post-communist          
countries’ (2011).  
In the 1980s the French Post, Telegraph and Telephone organization started to unroll a              
device called the “Minitel” in order to connect French citizens over a network. This was a                
predecessor of the World Wide Web, and it allowed different users to access services such as                
online shopping, phone directories and databases. This project provides an example of how a              
central institution ​pushed policies to open ICTs towards the general public for improving             
connectivity. ​A brief historical perspective of this project is introduced with Maillands and             
Driscoll’s ‘​Minitel: Welcome to the Internet’ (2017). The report called ‘The Computerization of             
Society’ (1980)​, ​written by Simon Nora and Alain Minc, is also revised in this section as it                 
outlined the project’s original intentions and needs. This report was commissioned by president             
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to assess how the French State could undertake a digital experiment of               
such scale. The way this project surpassed its initial intentions and was modified by users is                
addressed with Tamara Chaplin’s ‘Lesbians Online: Queer Identity and Community Formation           
on the French Minitel’ (2014). This case study helps the debate regarding how Technological              
Determinism is eclipsed by Technological Intensification, meaning that the usage of technology            
is not defined by strict policies but rather by the goals and needs of communities.  
26 
 
Finland is nowadays a country that leads in terms of democracy, citizen participation and              
technology. The Nordic country has been the birthplace of companies such as Nokia and              
open-source operating systems such as Linux. The Welfare State seeks to use the advantages of               
ICTs to foster the well-being of its citizens and promote innovation. The technological and              
democratic phenomenon has been previously studied by scholars from two perspectives, one that             
praises the existing model and others that criticizes it. Literature from these two perspectives is               
reviewed for this case: Manuel Castells and Pekka Himanen book ‘The information society and              
the welfare state: The Finnish model’ (2002) ​and Heikii Patomaäki’s article ‘An Optical Illusion:              
The Finnish Model for the Information Age’​ ​(2003). 
Chile was a frontrunner in Latin America when it came to plan digital strategies for               
creating a more efficient government. The Cybersin project that was proposed under Salvador             
Allende’s presidency sought to use the power of networks in order to strengthen the economy               
under a socialist model. Two books from Eden Medina, Associate Professor of Science,             
Technology, and Society at MIT, are vital in this discussion, as these are two of the few pieces of                   
research that deal with democracy and digital culture in Latin America: ‘Cybernetic            
Revolutionaries: Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile’ ​(2011) and Beyond Imported           
Magic: Essays on Science, Technology, and Society in Latin America’ ​(2014). Medina’s books             
provide an overview of Cybersin, and they help us to understand the political and social turmoil                
that took place in Chile before and during the military coup of 1973 (that established a                
dictatorship that lasted for seventeen years). 
The One Laptop per Child (OLPC) project was created by Nicholas Negroponte, former             
director of the MIT Media Lab, in order to bridge the digital gap in the world. The goal was to                    
distribute cheap (but yet efficient) laptops in low income countries. Ames Morgan, ​assistant             
professor at the Center for Science, Technology, Medicine and Society (CSTMS) at the             
University of California, Berkeley, analyzes how the introduction of the OLPC project in             
Paraguay did not go as planned in her text ‘Translating Magic: The Charisma of One Laptop per                 
Child’s XO Laptop in Paraguay’ (2014). She discusses how digital tools that were developed and               
built in technological hubs (such as the MIT) can fail when introduced in different social and                
political realities.; even though it was their original goal. The mismatch between expectation and              
27 
 
reality is further discussed in the article ​‘One Laptop per Child: Vision vs. Reality’ (2009),               
written by Kraemer, Kenneth, Jason Dedrick, and Prakul Sharma. 
The methodology of introducing, discussing and comparing the previous examples and           
sources provide a background for the analysis of the following two case studies in Colombia:               
Vive Digital (VD) and Linternet. Four core elements are reviewed within these: (1) how ICTs are                
introduced in a society that is undergoing major political and social transitions and             
transformations, (2) how a central Government deals with the expansion of ICTs for democracy              
and citizen participation, (3) how are the ICTs tools provided by and authority, and how (4) the                 
development and implementation of these technologies can be affected by social and political             
structures.  
The VD project was designed and implemented during the Government of Juan Manuel             
Santos (2010-2018). The goal of this was to introduce ICTs and connect remote areas of               
Colombia that were historically neglected. The intention was to provide Internet service to rural              
communities and foster peacebuilding initiatives that came with the Peace Agreement. Three VD             
locations were visited (Santa Marta, Cali and Mocagua), and interviews were conducted with the              
local project managers. The following four questions were asked during the conversations with             
them: (1) What was the project's origin, and which were the initial goals? (2) How were users                 
included during the planning process? (3) How did users react and respond to the digital tools                
that were offered by the program? (4) Were there any unexpected results of how ICTs were used                 
and appropriated by the communities? Four former users that were taking their internship at the               
Santa Marta center were also interviewed. This took place as a round table, where they were able                 
to share thoughts and discuss with each other. The following questions were asked to them: (1)                
Was the community involved in the planning process? (2) Were the program’s goals shared? (3)               
Did the ICTs that were offered fit your personal interests? (4) Did you use the digital tools for                  
achieving personal interests outside the project’s scope?  
Linternet ​is a project run by Camilo Herrera, which initially aimed to close the gap of                
what is called “energy poverty” in Colombia. The goal was to bring cheap light sources to                
regions where there was scarce or complete lack of street lighting. The project was initially               
called “A Liter of Light”​, ​and it provided public lighting by using cheap materials like plastic                
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bottles, bulbs and chlorine. Linternet ​(a combination of lantern and internet in Spanish) is a               
spin-off of this initial program. The project provides wifi through routers that are attached to               
lamp posts (powered by solar panels) that stand on the streets of rural communities. Camilo               
Herrera was interviewed, and the same four questions that were asked to the project managers of                
VD were asked to him. 
Qualitative interviewing is the main method by which information is collected for            
analyzing these two cases, as this is a fundamental method for understanding experiences (Weis,              
1994, loc.108). It is critical for this research to have a personal encounter and conversation with                
the communities, rather than reaching them online and conducting quantitative research based on             
surveys, as access that may facilitate this type of methodology ‘remains stratified by class, race,               
and gender of both researches and respondents’ (Murthy, 2008, 839)​. Qualitative interviewing            
allows as well to understand how events are interpreted, and not only how events take place                
(Weis, 1994, loc.293). This method provides an understanding of how ICTs projects succeed or              
fail. 
Ethical components are considered in this research, especially since the subjects of study             
belong to regions that have been historically neglected by the state (causing environments of              
poverty and inequality). By doing so, this thesis does not establish a division between “them”               
and “us”. The research does not seek to make judgments on how communities use ICTs or social                 
media. Rather it focuses the debate on how efforts combining ICTs and peacebuilding take place,               












4. ICTs’ Socio-Political Institutions 
 
The introduction, literature review and methodology have explained the goals and scope            
of this research. It is time to dive into case studies that help to understand how specific social,                  
cultural and political characteristics have an impact on the implementation and development of             
ICTs, and how the processes and results vary depending on the location. This chapter intends to                
highlight examples where political, social and cultural aspects played a major role in the              
implementation of ICTs. The cases that follow belong to the former Soviet Union, Estonia,              
France, and Finland. 
 
USSR: The Soviet Internet  
The Internet’s early days were used as an example in the introduction of this thesis to                
point out how present-day technology has origins in western countries, and how these were the               
product of military needs and research. The Internet had several phases, and just a brief account                
of them was given (as these in themselves can be a matter of other theses). The underlying issue                  
is that the expansion of the networks that resulted in the Internet were shaped by social, political                 
and cultural aspects from the 1950’s American society. However, this does not mean that there               
were no other efforts around the world to create computer networks. Scientists from the former               
Soviet Union had also planned to connect the country through computers, similarly to what the               
American counterpart did with the ARPANET. Nevertheless, it was the American model that             
boosted the development of networks, to the extent that it became the base of today’s World                
Wide Web. This section analyzes the Soviet Internet, and it gives an account of how the pursuit                 
of computerization failed due to political, social and economic models, and not necessarily             
because of a technological backwardness.  
Benjamin Peters explores these issues in his book ​How Not to Network a Nation: The               
Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet​. He analyzes the reasons for which a Soviet Internet never                
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took off, even though the Soviet Union was the front-runner in space, rocket and nuclear               
research. One assumption that he strives to debunk is the idea that networking on a large scale                 
did not become a reality in the USSR because of the communist and socialist models. The fall of                  
the iron curtain has been used to prove the success of capitalist economic models, or even to                 
imply that this is better than other systems. This is not the case with Peters’ arguments, as he                  
points out that ‘network projects without political and economic liberal values are not             
condemned from the start (Peters, 2016, 192), and that the ‘Soviet networks projects did not fail                
because they did not possess the engines of particular Western political values’ (2016, 192). He               
claims that these were not feasible for ‘their own reasons’ (2016, 192). According to him,               
networks are not just a matter of connecting cables, nor of implementing techniques and devices,               
but are rather ‘arrangements of social relations’ (2016, 206). The success or failure of networks               
is not a matter of technological limitations, but rather of human decisions and interactions.  
The main project that sought to connect the Soviet Union was called The All-State              
Automated System (OGSA), which ran from 1959 until 1989. Scientist Viktor Glushkov, leader             
of the team’s project, wanted to create a computerized network for supporting the Soviet              
economic model by improving communication and management. His ambition was to ‘network,            
store, transmit, optimize, and manage the information flows that constituted the command            
economy’ (Peters, 2016, 2). This aspiration seemed, at the beginning, aligned with communist             
ideas of how to distribute work and resources. It was envisioned as a network in service of the                  
State. This marks a difference with the American side of the story, as in this latter case the                  
networking efforts were aimed for military purposes. Networking, in the Soviet Union, was not              
planned as a survival mechanism for standing and reacting to a nuclear attack, but rather to                
overcome the slowness of bureaucracy. However, the relationship between the civilian and the             
military was one of the key aspects that lead to the failure of the Soviet Internet. 
Peters explains that the Internet in the USSR was a matter of constant disagreement              
between different civilian and military stakeholders and powers (2016, 193). The military was             
not interested in undertaking joint ventures with civilian counterparts, even less when it came to               
the management of the economy (2016, 191). The military industry in the USSR ‘consumed              
resources and hoarded innovations from the civilian economy’ (2016, 198), so they were not              
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interested in any technological reform that could change the status quo. Peters points out that this                
was an advantage in the network development stateside, as the ‘military-industrial-academic           
complex (...) allowed for cross-sector knowledge exchange and innovation transfer’ (2016, 197).            
The public scope increased due to this complex, whereas in the USSR the ‘military, the               
corporation and the state compelled (...) into using their private economic (...) interests’ (2016,              
194), rather than venturing into opening to technical changes that would have crossed several              
sectors of society. The bureaucratic establishment and the strict military model made it             
impossible for OGSA (and other networking attempts) to flourish. 
In 1991, months before the collapse of the USSR, scientists Sergei Mayorov and Leonid              
Polyakov (from the Moscow Institute for Automated Systems) wrote an article called ​“Online in              
The Soviet Union”​. They acknowledge in this text that, to the surprise of many, an online                
industry existed in the Soviet Union, though it was not as developed as in other western countries                 
(Mayorov & Polyakov, 1991, 105). These authors focus on the existence and development of              
databases, and how different stakeholders could access them online. They address the            
technicalities behind how soviet users could connect to foreign databases and how foreign users              
could connect to soviet databases. Their analysis focused specifically on database access, and             
they predicted that online solutions were going to face many difficulties in the future. They               
concluded that information and databases were going to disseminate better on ‘disk, tapes, and              
CD-ROMs’ (1991, 108) rather than online systems, as networking hardware was too expensive             
and that there was little management experience (1991, 108). This issue, according to them, was               
a barrier for fostering online services inside the USSR. 
New efforts for connecting networks in Russia arose after the fall of the iron curtain. One                
example of this is the SOVAM Teleport program, a joint enterprise between Russian and              
American enterprises (in fact SOVAM stands for Soviet-American). Viktor E. Teremetsky,           
former Co-Director General of SOVAM Teleport, explains that there were favorable situations            
for the development of telecommunications services in the 1990s (Teremetsky, 1994, 68). There             
was an increasing interest in the Russian markets and in creating alliances with foreign              
companies (1994, 68). SOVAM managed to provide ‘more freedom of communication to            
different groups in society’ (1994, 68), to the extent that engineers and researchers were able to                
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communicate easily with colleagues abroad (1994, 68). This joint venture showed that providing             
online services was more efficient with a less bureaucratic structure. 
 
e-Estonia: going digital after liberation 
 ‘We have built a digital society and so can you’ (e-Estonia, 2020), is the opening header                
of e-estonia.com. E-Estonia is a brand that focuses on promoting Estonia as a digital forerunner,               
and it showcases the benefits of prioritizing technology for democratic and social development.             
The government of the Baltic country explains and invites people to join the digital journey on                
their official website. It is mentioned there that ‘The Estonian dream is to have as little state as                  
possible, but as much as is necessary’ (e-Estonia, 2020), and it is explained that ​their goal is to                  
provide easy communication and access to state services through digital tools, rather than             
through cumbersome channels and procedures. The days where a central authoritarian and            
bureaucratic government stood in the way of the citizens are gone. So far the numbers show that                 
Estonia’s Government has managed to keep up the pace, and plan for the future. The country’s                
national narrative changed with the use of the digital tools, and it has become an example of                 
successful digitization.  
As mentioned before, the State provides 99% of its services online, 46.7% of Estonians              
use internet voting, 98% of the citizens have an electronic ID card, and there are even ongoing                 
innovative projects to protect their data with the Data Embassies. This last is, in short, an attempt                 
to place servers owned by the state in foreign countries, where the most critical and confidential                
data can be stored (e-Estonia Digital Embassy, 2020). The goal is to have more control over the                 
information, rather than with other services (like cloud computing), and by also ensuring             
‘protection and immunity as with traditional embassies’ (e-Estonia Digital Embassy, 2020. With            
this, the Estonian Government keeps shifting the perception of citizenship and even diplomacy in              
the digital age, for the sake of improving their e-governance.  
However, succeeding in improving and maintaining good services by introducing          
e-governance is not a general rule, as these initiatives have a failure rate of 85% (Gil-Garcia,                
2006, 1). Nevertheless, governments around the world keep investing money in these types of              
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initiatives (2006, 1). Estonia is seen as a successful case of a former socialist country that is                 
today associated with the wealthiest countries worldwide and is rather associated with Nordic             
countries rather than with European ex-socialist countries (2006, 1). It is seen as a beacon when                
it comes to social transformation through technology. The stories behind the Estonian case can              
help to better understand how a country in social and political transition used ICTs to intensify                
such changes, rather than to impose technology to push results.  
Professor Meelis Kitsing, from the Estonian Business School, describes in his text            
“Success without strategy: E-Government Development in Estonia'' how such usage of ICTs            
took place originally, and how it was initially introduced by private stakeholders. Kitsing’s             
approach is valuable as he doubts a plain and monolithic version of success, as he analyses                
projects that failed, and as he distances himself with the official e-Government rhetoric.             
However, before diving properly into the case it is relevant to clarify the terms: e-democracy and                
e-Government. These have gained popularity over the last few years, and they have been used               
interchangeably. Nevertheless, there is a difference that must be pointed out: E-democracy            
means how ICTs are used by a state to provide access, information and knowledge about               
political processes, whereas E-Government refers to the usage and application of ICTs for             
providing state services (Lee, Chung-Pin, Chang & Berry, 2011, 444). In Estonia, there is both               
E-democracy and E-Government.  
Kitsing claims that the history of ICTs behind Estonia’s democracy and governance is             
“more heterogeneous” than considered before, by explaining the role of certain policies that date              
back to the Soviet era and the post-soviet private sector (specially banking institutions) (2011, 1).               
For example, he explains that computer programming was fostered as a profession since the              
1960s due to Soviet regulations (whereas math and engineering were primarily fostered in other              
Soviet countries) (2011, 5). Soon after independence, in 1993, the well-formed IT community in              
Estonia outlined the strategy for establishing the base for the E-Government, and a             
Governmental special IT department with its own budget was created(2011, 5). Kitsing’s            
research explains that the concept and development of an e-Government establishment found its             
way into the political rhetoric of the time, where right-wing politicians sought to encourage              
progress with technology, whereas left-wing forces were more skeptical and cautious (2011, 6).             
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This means that there were two major forces that made e-Government possible: the high amount               
of IT professionals, and politicians willing to vouch for the need of ICTs in the new country’s                 
model, where ‘the IT community was interested in putting its knowledge into practice, while              
political leaders viewed IT as a means to achieve and efficient and minimal Government’ (2011,               
9). 
 
Minitel: A Network for the People  
The Minitel was a state funded project that ran from 1980 till 2012 in France. The goal                 
behind it was to modernize the central government and create a network to benefit hundreds of                
citizens with access to online public services. The Minitel was also created as a response to the                 
unstable politics of the period and the oil crisis in the 1970s. The French state wanted to gain                  
independence from the networks built by the UK and the US, especially from the dominance of                
IBM in the computing market. ​President Valery Giscard d’Estaing was concerned about these             
matters, therefore political advisors ​Simon Nora and Alain Minc were hired in order to make an                
assessment on how the Government could create strategies for fostering computation in France.  
The result of their research was the “The Computerization of Society” report (first             
published in 1978), which analyzed the state of the art regarding technology and communication              
within French society and politics. The authors encouraged the president to take actions in order               
to stimulate local development in the field of computers and telecommunications, which they             
coined as Telematics (Nora & Simon, 1980, 4). According to their counsel, the State needed to                
take two roles: on the one hand as an agent for establishing a network, while on the other as a                    
computer terminal distributor. The authors discussed how the computing power had grown            
exponentially over time while the manufacturing prices had dramatically dropped to a fraction of              
what they cost before (1980, 16), therefore they strongly encouraged the government to legislate              
for fostering the Telematis and the tech industry in order to ‘develop domestic hardware and               
software’ (1980, 106). They pointed out that the state would benefit directly from a technological               
revolution, as it could extend ‘its fields of action’ (1980,100). The ideas from Nora and Minc                
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were well received, and the government decided to follow the guidelines for stimulating local              
development and distribution of computer terminals from which users could access a net.  
However, such ideas and policies challenged the centralized French political tradition, as            
they addressed a duality between two types of strategies for centralization and decentralization at              
the same time. The project was supervised by a central authority, the French Postal, Telegraph               
and Telephone Service (PTT), while it sought to allow ‘local municipalities more            
freedom’(1980, 5) and it reinforced ‘the competitiveness of the small and mid-size business             
vis-a-vis the large enterprises’ (1980, 5). This special characteristic differentiates this case with             
how ICTs were introduced and implemented in Estonia after the democratization. The French             
political tradition of control and centralized power shaped how the Minitel project was             
implemented (with regulations and the dichotomy between centralization and decentralization as           
mentioned before), whereas the Government in Estonia took a more liberal approach of limiting              
the state’s role (‘as little state as possible’ (e-Estonia Solutions, 2020) and allowing less              
regulated participation from private companies. The Minitel project depended on a strict            
bureaucratic structure, where the Estonian Government sought ‘to build a fully functioning            
country from scratch’ (e-Estonia, 2020), while they were aware that they could not ‘afford the               
bureaucracy of a developed democracy’(e-Estonia, 2020). The ways these two projects were            
designed and developed reflect the difference of their political and social contexts. 
The French Government unveiled the Minitel project in 1980, following the guidelines            
provided by Nora and Minc, with the initial task of replacing the printed phone book with a                 
digital service. The Government improved the country’s network and financed and distributed            
thousands of Minitel terminals over the years. France became, with this approach and project,              
one of the best-connected countries in the world. It must be pointed out at this point that the                  
French network was a closed net, only accessed in France by those who had the adequate                
devices. However, the Minitel network is indeed a predecessor of the modern World Wide Web.               
It was also a predecessor to online marketplaces such as the App Store or Google play, where                 
third parties provide, create and sell services over the network. The Minitel network had its own                
marketplace called “Le kiosk” (which was under strong state control), from where different             
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services could be purchased (ranging from online tickets, subscriptions to newspapers and            
magazines, and even chat rooms). 
The Minitel quickly became part of the French public life and popular culture, and many               
citizens were dragged into the network as the services expanded (Mailland & Driscoll, 2017, 97).               
The digital offer increased rapidly, to the extent that sexual and explicit content started to be                
offered and distributed over the network. Not even the ones who opposed this outcome could               
match the benefits of the revenues, as Mailland and Driscoll explain: ‘sexy chats may not have                
been part of the original plan for Minitel, and not everyone was happy about the emerging                
culture, but Telétel administrators did not want to stanch this new stream of revenue” (2017, 99).                
It is for this reason that French authorities developed a double moral standard, where publicly               
they wanted to ban certain content, but privately they were satisfied with the profit.  
Sexuality was explored within the new digital tools in different ways, not only limited to               
pornographic or x rated content. American scholar Tamara Chaplin researched the lesbian            
community within the French Minitel, where she points out that the combination of network and               
terminals opened the possibility for connecting the lesbian community in a digital arena             
regardless on location and proximity (Chaplin, 2014, 452). However, her findings show that the              
conformation of a lesbian community online was not very successful, due to the way Minitel and                
the Kiosks worked. Users had to pay per minute of connection, meaning that they were charged                
depending how long they spent online. Chaplin explains that the activist group “Les Goudous              
Télématiques'' (the GTs) tried to keep the digital community alive, but it never grew big enough                
to be kept online as “only seventy-five to ninety lesbians actually subscribed to the service               
between 1985 and 1988 (2014, 469). The community did not attract enough paying users, so it                
was not financially viable. Chaplin mentions that ‘despite their enthusiasm, the GTs never             
managed to convince their audiences that the Minitel offered women a vital service’ (2014, 469),               




Finland: ICTs and the Welfare State 
The previous case studies in this thesis have pointed out how networks were built and               
introduced in countries that were facing particular challenges, and that had different economical             
and political models. These previous examples can be framed within capitalist or communist             
models. However, this discussion is not limited by these two. Manuel Castells and Pekka              
Himanen analyze how ICTs were promoted and expanded under a Welfare state model in their               
book ​The information society and the Welfare State: The Finnish model ​(2002). This case is               
presented in this research at this point to balance the ideas, and to avoid giving the impression                 
that ICTs will flourish with more ease depending on one economic model of the other. 
Castells and Himanen introduce their book by discussing the idea of the ‘information             
society’ (2), by explaining that information is the motor that moves modern society and              
economy. Their focus on Finland seeks to explain that the rise of information societies ‘can exist                
(...) in a plurality of social and cultural models (....), and even antagonistic, models of modernity’                
(2). Their goal is to tackle these matters based on research, and not on ideology (4). The core                  
issue that the authors point out about the Finnish model, and that separates it from others, is how                  
the well-being of society was the starting point for the decisions made by the authorities. They                
claim that the general information society is driven by the need of connecting the ones who are                 
valuable to the economic model and disconnecting those who are considered as valueless (6).              
This increases, according to them, ‘inequality, polarization, and poverty’ (6). The ‘distinctive            
feature of Finland’ (12) was that the government managed to combine the information society              
and the welfare state (12) successfully in the 90s and early 2000s. The Finish model made                
possible the thrive of companies and programming projects, such as Nokia and Linux.  
The Finnish government invested specifically in two areas in order to build and promote              
an equal information society: higher education and innovations funds. On the first hand,             
education in Finland is focused on research, and is ‘very technology-centered’ (51). All Finish              
nationals have the right to access free and high-quality education programs under the Welfare              
State, which has made the country one of the most educated ones in the world. On the other                  
hand, the State provided grants for research and development through the Tekes and Sitra              
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programs. The former focuses on helping to transform research onto ‘exportable products’ (52),             
and it has a ‘business-oriented approach’ (52). The latter serves as a venture capitalist grant that                
supports the establishment of start-up companies (53). This shows that the Welfare State has a               
holistic approach towards research and innovation in technology, as it starts with providing             
education and later supports the researchers to step out of academia and into the realm of market. 
Universities in Finland began to be connected by national networks in the 1970s; Sitra              
funded the first national university network in 1971 (65). These networks facilitated the flow of               
information, as researchers from different cities in the country could easily communicate with             
each other. This environment, according to Castells and Himanen, fostered the hacking            
community within the nordic state. Hackers, in this case, are not considered as ‘computer              
criminals’ (46), but rather as experts that are driven by a ‘creative passion’ (46). Having a                
functional network that works efficiently is important in this hacker culture, as ‘development             
work is kept open to a degree in which others can join in the realization of the idea’ (46).                   
Hackers in Finland, according to the authors, used the available networks as a creation              
environment where a community was able to back the development of projects. 
However, the road to the information society and the attention paid by authorities to the               
importance of networks did not come out of the blue. Finland leapfrogged in computer              
communication networks in great part because of the influence of other Nordic countries, and              
from the alliances that were made between these. Norway was actually the first country that was                
connected to the American ARPANET network in the 1970s (Lehtisalo, 2005, 8). The             
collaborative work between American and Norwegian scientists was initially targeted to gather            
and monitor data from the ‘Soviet Union’s nuclear arms testing (2005, 10). Nevertheless,             
Norwegians were experimenting with internal protocols before they connected to the           
ARPANET, but these efforts were purely academic and not open to the general public (10).               
Similar endeavors were taking place in other Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark and             
Iceland), so scientists and authorities worked on a joint networking program to connect these              
five. The result was NORDUNET, which started to operate in 1985. Castells and Himanen point               
out that American authorities saw Finland as an ally to the Soviet Union, so there was initial                 
resistance and skepticism of connecting the NORDUNET to the ARPANET (Castells and            
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Himanen, 2002, 66). Nonetheless, Finland managed to broaden its national network and become             
one of the European network forerunners. 
Castells and Himanen have a very optimistic tone in their book. It ultimately gives the               
impression that Finland has an almost perfect model for how to network a nation and combine                
the benefits of the Welfare State with the information society. However, not all voices are               
satisfied with the positive approach. Heikki Patomäki, Professor of International Relations at the             
University of Helsinki, takes a more critical stand than Castells and Himanen in his book review                
‘An Optical Illusion: The Finnish Model for the Information Age’ (2002). He claims that the               
authors of the Finnish Model misrepresented developments in Finland, and furthermore, that they             
framed ‘the question in a misleading way’ (1). Patomäki points out that the researchers did not                
attempt to explain ‘long-term economic developments’ in the Nordic country, but rather were             
interested in very concrete examples. Castells and Himanen oppose Finland to Silicon Valley,             
where they claim that information society creates social divisions, with the goal of portraying the               
Nordic country as a ‘success story’ (2). Patomäki argues that Castells and Himanen are biased               
and that they direct their examples to exalt the wonders of the Finish Model, instead of having a                  
critical approach. He claims that the book’s major flaw is that it shows one side of the story, and                   
therefore creates an illusion that presents Finland as an ideal model. The Finnish professor points               
out that inequality in the country increased during the 1990s, when the idea of the information                
society was taking place. Patomäki claims that Finland, in the long run, is ‘rapidly moving               
towards the state of affairs that exist in California’ (4), which ultimately affects the welfare               
system. He explains that capital and income shares grew dramatically in the hands of a few,                
resulting in an ‘unjust, exclusive and violent society’ (5) as ‘liberalization, deregulation and             
privatization are in fact undermining the conditions for further growth in Finland’ (5). Patomäki              
suggests that the resulting products and projects the Welfare State promoted for networking and              
fostering the information society model can after some time turn against it, to the point of                






5. Democracy,  Education and ICTs in Latin America 
Latin American scholars have studied science and technology within the region with an             
independent and critical approach since the 1980s. The emergence of Postcolonial studies and             
Latin American studies served as a basis for analyzing local phenomena with more autonomy, in               
order to understand processes not only under the scrutiny of ‘foreign control’ (Medica, Marque              
& Holmes, 2014, 4). The scientific and technological products are not seen any longer as               
elements that are developed in western countries and later introduced with no resistance in the               
territory. The book ​Beyond Imported Magic: Essays on Science, Technology, and Society in             
Latin America​, edited by professors in Latin American Studies Eden Medina, Ivan da Costa              
Marques and Christina Holmes, is a testimony of such academic efforts. They point out in the                
introduction that, in the 1970s, brazilian students at the engineering school (Universidade Federal             
do Rio de Janeiro) 'referred to computers as a form of “imported magic”’ (2014, 1). This notion                 
stressed the idea that there was a transfer of superior technologies from North to South that                
appeared magical on its arrival, while ignoring how the different traits in users and contexts               
(2014, 2).  
Beyond Imported Magic ​provides alternative accounts to this previous perception, and it            
serves as a guide ‘on local innovation and use(...), the creation of hybrid technologies and forms                
of knowledge production’ (2014, 2). Furthermore, the editors and contributors acknowledge that            
Latin America in itself cannot be contained under one Latin-American identity, but that is ‘rather               
an open one, linked to global flows of labor, capital, and cultural hybridization’ (2014, 2).               
Therefore, the discussion needs a ‘regional focus’ (2014, 2), as the territory cannot be seen as                
homogenous. This poses a challenge, as each country in itself (and perhaps it could be argued                
that any other in the world) is a result of a ‘cultural hybridization’. This must be considered                 
during the discussion in order to have a critical view on how technology is introduced and used                 
in specific contexts. This chapter examines two case studies of technologies that were introduced              
in Latin America with the goal of fostering democracy and education, which began with              
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momentum and later faded into disuse: Cybersyn in Chile and One Laptop per Child (OLPC) in                
Paraguay. 
Cybersyn: ICTs for the Socialist State 
Salvador Allende’s arrival to power in 1970 in Chile marked a milestone in the hopes and                
dreams of a peaceful transition towards a socialist state in South America, especially during the               
cold war tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. The former sought to influence                
internal affairs of Latin American nations in order to counter the revolutionary sentiment that              
sprouted during the Cuban Revolution of 1959. While the latter did the same to support               
anti-American movements around the region. Allende’s presidency pledged independence from          
these two fronts (Medina, 2011, 219), and was not short of promises for changing the Chilean                
social, political and economic structures. Some of which included the use of technology. Eden              
Medina, Associate Professor of Informatics and Computing at Indiana University, studies           
thoroughly the relationship between technology and Politics and her book “Cybernetic           
Revolutionaries” (2011). She presents an historical account of project Cybersyn (cybernetics +            
synergi), the network that was supposed to support Allende to regulate the economy under a               
socialist model, while analyzing and discussing the challenges and reach. 
Medina explains that Fernando Flores, an engineer who worked for the new government,             
saw the opportunity of creating a computational system and network that would support the              
socialist state, and help it become more efficient. He was familiar with concepts and authors that                
discussed how to implement technology for backing institutional changes. The foremost author            
in his list was Stafford Beer, a British professor and consultant who theorized about the role of                 
Cybernetics in organizational and management transformations. Beer’s writings and concepts          
were aligned with Allende’s ideals of distribution, and they fitted quite well with the political               
discourse of democratic socialism (835). Beer stressed the importance of balancing the forms of              
communication and control (816), and he envisioned a system that would help organizations to              
become more efficient with ‘horizontal and vertical forms of communication and control’ (816).             
He proposed a system that avoided a strict top to down hierarchy, but that was rather composed                 
by subsystems that had independence to perform without risking the system as a whole (816).               
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The British consultant claimed that Cybernetics could be used and applied to industrial             
organization management (593), as it was a field that gathered different professionals with the              
goal of using science for developing effective organizations (594). For these reasons, Flores             
invited Beer in 1971 to come to Chile to lead the development of a cybernetic system. The goal                  
was to support the governmental ‘management on a national level during a moment of political               
transformation’ (489). The British consultant accepted the invitation, as it was hard to resist an               
opportunity to apply his ideas on the real world (489).  
Allende’s government was in need of networking the country through computational           
systems for one reason in particular: the main industries were forced to be under state control                
under a strong nationalization process. The government structure was very bureaucratic, so a             
better and more agile command of the national industry was required for Allende’s socialist              
model to work. Technology was perceived as the key element for solving the challenges that               
nationalization of industries created. For example, the number of state employees grew (as an              
effort to reduce unemployment), but the number of qualified professionals to run the industries              
was very low (251). It was thought that a Cybernetic system would allow a reduced number of                 
workers to manage and control efficiently the industries as a whole.  
However, such a nationalization process was strongly resisted inside and outside Chile,            
and it faced many challenges the first year (1138). Popular opposition grew in 1971, just after                
Beer’s arrival to Chile, as Fidel Castro himself flew to the country as a guest of honour in order                   
to support ‘Chile’s revolutionary process’ (1212). The US government under Nixon’s           
administration, reacted to Allende’s arrival to power, and efforts to steer the country into a               
socialist model, with a financial blockade and a reduction of aid funds (242). These posed a                
challenge not only to Chile’s exports and imports of goods and raw materials, but also on the                 
work that Beer and his colleagues were undertaking.  
Their goal was to network the country with edge technology, but the blockade stopped              
them from updating the country’s technological resources. The British consultant and his team             
were forced to ‘engineer a new approach to computer networking that differed from the              
approaches used by other nations’ (429). The Chilean state had, in 1971, access to only four                
mainframe machines, three from IBM and one from Burroughs. Only one was given to Beer and                
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his team. It became a difficult task for the government to increase the number of machines, not                 
only because of the blockade but also because these companies decided to withdraw and              
decrease operations in Chile as they saw a risk of ‘government expropriation’ (1625). Chile had a                
very limited computed power, so Beer and his team were pushed to build an entire network with                 
no more than five computers (1636).  
The project prototype was unveiled to the public in 1973, and it was quickly criticized.               
Both British and Chilean press accused the government of developing the Cybersyn network in              
order to have more control over society, acting as a ‘Big Brother’ that would be able to observe                  
and surveil citizens. It was perceived by public opinion as a tool for sustaining an authoritarian                
and totalitarian regime rather than for managing the economy in a democracy. However, as              
explained before, Allende’s government did not have the intention of monitoring society, but             
rather creating a distributed network of communication (1751). The project was, from Beer’s             
point of view, a ‘weapon against state bureaucracy’ (3955), instead against democratic            
institutions. However, these critics did not stop the project from becoming a reality. The project               
was stopped by the abrupt changes on the Chilean democratic system.  
Cybersyn depended completely on ‘the fate of Chilean socialism’ (4805), and this came             
to an end after the military coup d’état led by Augusto Pinochet in 1973. The military                
government saw no use for using a networked system that sought to control the ‘nationalized               
economy’ (4833), and by 1975 they had dropped all Cybersyn efforts and shifted to a neoliberal                
economic model (4833). At the end, ‘Chile was not able to implement its political dream of                
democratic socialism or its technological dream of real-time economic management’ (457), but            
this case study shows how communication technologies and networks were used to foster ‘social,              
economic, and political change’ (457). Eden Medina points out that Cybersyn also helps to show               
that technological innovations in computing and networking have happened in different           




OLPC in Paraguay: Technology as a Charismatic Object 
The One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) is a non-profit project led by Nicholas Negroponte,              
founder of the MIT Media Lab. It started in 2005 with the goal of creating ‘educational                
opportunities for the world’s poorest children by providing each child with a rugged, low-cost,              
low-power, connected laptop with content and software designed for collaborative, joyful,           
self-empowered learning’ (OLPC, 2020). These machines, the XO laptops, have special design            
and manufacturing characteristics. On one hand, they are carefully produced to be dirt and              
moisture resistant, so that they can endure different weather conditions (Roberts and Zamora,             
2012, 802). On the other hand, their low price of 100 USD makes them cheap enough for                 
purchasing and distributing in developing countries. OLPC works with partner organizations in            
different countries in order to introduce the initiative and provide children with the computers. 
In 2008, Paraguay Educa (a local NGO) partnered with local and national governmental             
institutions with the goal of bringing OLPC to the country (Ames, 2014, 207). The project and                
the program had good intentions at the beginning, but the development and results proved to be                
problematic. Morgan Ames, ​assistant professor at the Center for Science, Technology, Medicine            
and Society (CSTMS) at the University of California, Berkeley, has analyzed the impact of the               
OLPC project in different contexts, including Paraguay. She explains that one of the reasons for               
which OLPC faced issues in this country was that Paraguay Educa adopted the ideals that OLPC                
designed at MIT without a critical approach (208). The underlying issue was that users had               
different hopes, and these ‘often did not coincide with those of either OLPC or Paraguay Educa’                
(208) 
Ames describes the XO laptops as a ‘charismatic objects’ (208), as these have the ability               
to ‘evoke nostalgic and often individualist stories that many in the technology community tell              
about their own childhood experiences with computers’ (208). The designers and supporters are             
involved in the project based on emotions and personal memories, on how computers helped              
them to discover and explore in their own childhood. Their goal is to replicate such experiences                
in children facing poverty and difficult conditions. This seems right, but the problem can be               
thought of as a ‘expectation VS reality’ meme: reality quite often differs from expectations.  
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Paraguay Educa introduced OLPC in different schools around the country, and training            
sessions were offered to the teachers. Initially the focus was on how to use basic operations, like                 
for example on how to use the programs, web browser and the built-in camera (211). However,                
there was no discussion on how to integrate the new tools with the existing curricula that they                 
were following (211). Teachers did not understand how the computers could be useful for              
learning on a regular basis, and there was little follow-up after the training (211). Ames points                
out that this confusion was due to the following issues: ‘only one in four teachers had a computer                  
at home, only one in eight had Internet access, and less than half had any access to or experience                   
with a computer’ (211). Teachers were unfamiliar not only with the practicalities of laptops (use               
software, camera, web browsers), but also with the concepts on how to plan educational              
activities with them. For this reason, teachers and students used laptops differently than they              
were originally initially intended. Ames explains that during her research she was told that the               
XO laptops were seen as ‘brightly colored plastic plaything’ (211) rather ‘than as a useful tool                
for learning’ (211). These were seen as toys and devices to play games with. The laptops were                 
not properly taken care of during the first years, as there was no follow up from Paraguay Educa                  
nor the government, and as these were seen barely as toys (212). The different stakeholders had                
different expectations from the laptops: Paraguay Educa and OLPC saw them as ‘education             
machines, the students as ‘media machines’ (212), whereas the teachers did not find them              
attractive (212).  
These issues posed a problem for the Paraguay Educa team. They changed their approach              
and started to invest more on training. They hired and trained members of the community, so that                 
they could help the teachers and students find ways on how to implement the laptops within the                 
curriculum (213). After this, computers were used more actively during classroom activities.            
However, according to Ames, the project in Paraguay did not accomplish the ideological goal of               
fostering education. Teachers and students were more drawn to the laptops by their charismatic              
traits and because they granted access to games and the Internet (220). 
By 2010 the OLPC project started to phase challenges on a worldwide level. Many              
countries cancelled purchases and decided to buy products from other companies such as Acer,              
HP and Asus which were offering similar products (Kennter, Dedrick and Sharme, 2010, 1).              
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OLPC began to face financial difficulties and ‘ideological disillusionment’ (1), as they were not              
able to fulfill the educational goal. For this reason, the project again changed its approach. They                
started to motivate the PC industry to develop low-cost laptops for education, instead of doing it                
themselves (1). However, the project did not anticipate the ‘social and institutional problems that              
could arise in trying to diffuse that innovation in developing-country context’ (1). The computers              
were properly designed and manufactured to resist different weather conditions, as explained            
before, but the cultural aspects of appropriation or resistance were not considered. The project              
had flaws when it came to the deployment. It was marketed as a low-cost laptop, but the actual                  
cost was not transparent. It did not include the training of teachers, the creation of digital content,                 
and the maintenance and support (5). The initial plan was that governments and local institutions               
were going to do this part of the job, but this was not efficient, and it did not work as expected                     
(5). The project’s main problem, in Paraguay and in other countries, is that it did not consider                 
local challenges, and cultural, social and political aspects. It was a project driven by the idea that                 
a device can produce educational changes, but the cultural aspects of the impact of introducing               


















6. ICTs and Peacebuilding in Colombia 
Different case studies where ICTs were involved in social and political transformation            
processes have been presented so far. These show how distinctive social and political             
characteristics in Europe and Latin America had an impact on developing and implementing ICT              
programs and policies. The importance of studying and evaluating technology from a cultural             
perspective has been stressed in this paper. This chapter addresses these discussions within the              
Colombian context, in order to answer the research question: ​How were the expansion of ICTs               
and peacebuilding strategies combined in Colombia since the 2010s? And how did peripheral             
communities ​appropriate the new tools to foster their aesthetic practices? 
 
Vive Digital: Narrowing the Digital Gap in Colombia  
Vive Digital ​(VD) (Live Digital in english) was an ICT project designed and promoted              
under the Government of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018). The Ministry of Information and             
Communications Technologies was in charge of establishing the guidelines and structure of the             
program. VD was divided in two phases: the first that ran from 2010 till 2014, and the second                  
from 2014 till 2018 (corresponding to the president’s two consecutive terms). The project as a               
whole did not change significantly over the years, though each segment was handled based on               
social and political shifts (the 2016 Peace Process being the most notorious one). It must be                
pointed out at this point that the project as a whole came to a halt in 2019, after the policies of                     
the newly elected Central Government were enforced and no further budget was given. This              
issue presented a challenge for this research, as there is not much available information from the                
VD program. 
VD was initially unveiled at ANDICOM 2010, Colombia’s International ICT Congress.            
Technology, policies, industry and digital economy are discussed in this yearly event            
(ANDICOM, 2019). The Governmental program was intended to cover the following needs:            
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providing technology to every Colombian in order to make life easier, close the digital gap,               
increase both internal broadband internet networks and improve the country’s international           
connection, expand fiber optics within the territory, and create physical infrastructure and endow             
it with computer terminals (Ministerio TIC Colombia, 2017). Three principles that characterize            
the overall project in Colombia are worth mentioning as well: (1) Freedom of market and less                
State control; (2) Encourage the supply and demand of digital services; (3) Reduce tax and               
regulatory barriers to facilitate the deployment of infrastructure and the supply of            
telecommunications services (MinTic Live Digital, 2019). These characteristics have similar          
traits to the ones described in previous case studies. They sought to introduce technology for               
improving citizens’ life conditions, they addressed inequality and advocated for digital solutions,            
and they stressed the importance of ensuring both networks and hardware. The project followed              
a liberal approach regarding social and economic policies, similarly to what was discussed             
previously in the case of e-Estonia. The role of the state had to be as minimal as possible, with                   
the idea that the market and services would flourish with less regulations after receiving an initial                
push from the Government. 
The positive results revealed in 2014 show how the project achieved some desired             
quantitative goals. By the end of the first stage all the municipalities within the country were                
connected to high-speed networks, the number of internet connections passed from 2,2 million in              
2010 to 8,8 million in 2014 (in a country of 45 million inhabitants), four more submarine cables                 
were added to the country’s network for a total of nine, and over 20,000 public schools, libraries                 
and community centers were equipped with computers and tablets; so that there was one              
computer for every two children, and one tablet for every four (Ministerio TIC Colombia, 2014).               
By the end of the first phase the politicians and managers identified future challenges for the                
ICTs projects, like for example: the creation of jobs, the reduction of poverty, the usage of ICTs                 
in a post-conflict scenario, and the improvement of education, health, justice and agriculture             
(Ministerio TIC Colombia, 2014). 
The country had a significantly better infrastructure by 2014, so the policies targeted the              
creation of content during the second stage of the project. Official guidelines also sought to               
promote the development of applications and programs that focused on peacebuilding, as the             
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Peace Negotiations between the Government and FARC were taking place in Cuba. VD was              
considered as a hub from where ICTs could positively impact society (Vive Digital Colombia,              
2014). There were three main goals during this new stage: encourage the development of apps               
aimed at the poorest and establish Colombia as a frontrunner in the development of such               
applications, foster peace, and improve the digital Government and services for making them             
more efficient and transparent (Vive Digital Colombia, 2014). The new phase even unveiled a              
new slogan: ‘Technology in the life of every Colombian to close the social gap’ (Vive Digital                
Colombia, 2014).  
Nicolás Llano Naranjo, expert in digital entrepreneurship and transformation in          
Colombia, was the Director for Vive Digital Regional (VDR) between 2013 and 2015. VDR was               
a branch of VD that focused on introducing ICTs in small communities and distant districts. He                
was interviewed for this research, as his expertise and knowledge helped to understand how VD               
took place on a practical level in three phases: planning, service and implementation. This              
discussion clarifies how the program evolved from idea to execution, rather than just focusing on               
facts and figures 
The planning stage, as he pointed out, consisted of identifying different successful ICTs              
projects that were already up and running within the country (led by either public or private                
sectors). The reasoning behind this was to foster efforts that were throwing positive results,              
rather than starting from scratch (in order to avoid intricate paths that would slow down the                
processes and cost more money). The goal was to be efficient and to build based on successful                 
previous experiences. This meant that an important aspect of this stage was to do feasibility               
studies in order to analyze if local activities could be scaled up on a national level. The intention                  
was to learn from regional strategies in order to establish national policies.  
Llano exemplified this with one case that was originally managed by The Bogota Phone              
Company (ETB for its acronym in Spanish). ETB, the public institution that handles ICTs in               
Bogotá, began to unfold a program in 2005 called ‘Interactive Portals’ (El Tiempo, 2005)​, which               
consisted of centers that were endowed with computers, internet access and even Xbox consoles.              
The project’s goals included: reducing the digital gap within the capital city, providing citizens              
with access to information and entertainment, and training users on how to use the digital tools.                
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The Interactive Portals ​were distributed evenly across the city, and the services were free of               
charge in the poorest areas and had a minimal cost in middle-class areas. ETB established               
alliances with public and private sectors (from within the City Hall and companies such as               
Microsoft, Intel, HP and Sun Microsystems), for finding locations, acquiring computers and            
hiring staff. One significant partnership was with the National Learning Service (SENA for its              
acronym in spanish), so that students could follow educational programs and get certificates of              
completion when attending from the Interactive Portals​. ​The success of this project was             
recognized by the Central Government, and it was used as a model to replicate around the                
country under the name of Punto Vive Digital (PVD). The expertise from ETB was              
acknowledged to the extent that The Bogota Phone Company was in charge for coordinating and               
managing several PVD around the country (Colombia Digital, 2012). 
The second stage (service) consisted of a portfolio of successful projects that could be              
replicated. VD worked as a menu, as Llano explained, from which local leaders and politicians               
could select a program that would fulfill their local needs. The reasoning behind this was that the                 
communities could decide what type of ICT scheme would be beneficial for them. Instead of               
appointing programs based on a centralized structure, VD provided services based on specific             
needs. The Central Government did not decide where the projects were implemented, but it was               
rather the community who made the call. Some services that could be selected, according to               
Llano, were among others: VD points (which were centers endowed with internet access and              
computers), tablets for educational purposes, training programs focused on digital          
entrepreneurship, or support for e-Government developing. 
However, VD did not ignore possible necessities or solutions that were outside its scope               
of action. It also supported local ICTs activities and programs that were already running, or even                
new ones that were envisioned by the communities. The VDR branch was in charge of these                
types of cases. This division, according to Llano, worked more as a lab where projects designed                
and run by locals were backed and promoted. If VD corresponded to predetermined programs              
that were offered, VDR consisted then of experimentation. The former VDR director pointed out              
the following examples that this branch financed: in 2015 the authorities of the Department of               
Chocó requested support in creating digital platforms focused on the National Sports Games that              
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they hosted, the leaders in the Island of San Andrés asked for guidance in creating digital content                 
for promoting tourism, and the local Government in the Region of Tolima called for digital help                
for improving cattle raising. These three, as Llano explains, show how VD and VDR were open                
to listen to the needs of communities and to provide the most adequate program according to                
their social and economic reality.  
The third and last phase (implementation) was characterized by the interaction between            
central and local governments. The former financed and the latter managed. The goal was for               
local authorities to run the programs, to make adjustments if needed, and even add budget when                
required. The idea behind this was to decentralize and decrease the dependence on Bogotá. The               
Ministry of Information and Communications Technologies kept supervising VD as a whole, but             
more liberties were given over time. The idea was that locals know best about their own                
interests. 
On a last note, Llano underlined his concern about the fact that information from the               
overall VD and VDR programs cannot be found online nowadays, as many of the links are                
broken (as a result of the changes in ICTs policies enforced by the new Government). He is                 
worried that the efforts are not continued, and that the project as a whole is going to be forgotten.                   
He gives an account of how the project was beneficial for hundreds of citizens living in districts,                 
and that still much work is needed in order to keep improving. 
For analyzing and finding an answer to the research question of this thesis three regional               
digital centers supported by VDR were visited, and interviews were conducted with local             
coordinators and users. Finding staff and people willing to share their experiences posed a              
challenge, as many PVD were closed and contact information was outdated. The three cases in               
Santa Marta, Cali and Mocagua responded to the call. The following four questions were asked               
to the persons in charge of managing the projects: (1) What was the project's origin, and which                 
were the initial goals? (2) How were users included during the planning process? (3) How did                
users react and respond to the digital tools that were offered by the program? (4) Were there any                  
unexpected results of how ICTs were used and appropriated by the communities? The following              
four questions were asked to users: (1) Was the community involved in the planning process? (2)                
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Were the program’s goals shared? (3) Did the ICTs that were offered fit your personal interests?                
(4) Did you use the digital tools for achieving personal interests outside the project’s scope?  
PVDLAB Santa Marta 
Jannia Rosette has been coordinating activities and projects from the PVD Lab in the city               
of Santa Marta since it was opened in 2017. This city is the largest from the Magdalena                 
Department, and is located in the northern part of the country by the shores of the Caribbean Sea.                  
The Lab was requested to the Central Government by the Governor’s office, which has been in                
charge of running the project since then. Rosette explained that the PVD Lab was a service that                 
the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies started to offer in 2017, with the              
goal of fostering the creation of audiovisual content. All PVD centers were endowed with              
internet access and computers, but the special characteristic of the Lab version, as Rosette              
explained, is that it is equipped as well with professional cameras, editing rooms and              
photography studios. The intention in this case was to foster film and photographic projects in               
the region by working in alliance with the Film and Audiovisual Media program (Faculty of               
Humanities) from the University of Magdalena. Support was provided to students and recent             
graduates who lacked the proper equipment for creating content, so they could improve their              
portfolio or start their own business (PVDLAB Santa Marta, 2018). The idea behind PVD Lab               
was to foster a new generation of professionals in visual media and become an incubator for                
entrepreneurship. Another goal, as the Peace Agreement was taking place, was to provide             
training in digital tools to vulnerable communities that had suffered from the aftermath of the               
conflict.  
Users, as it was explained, were not included during the initial planning process of the               
project as a whole (as this was selected from the national portfolio of existing services).               
However, the projects that are promoted from within the PVD Lab are previously discussed with               
the community, so that the offer meets the demands. These services are shared on social media,                
and open calls are made to anyone who wants to register. Some examples are: editing courses,                
usage of social media, content creation, camera operation, and even a film club. The services               
offered to vulnerable communities were more basic regarding the use of ICTs, and they were               
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more focused on how to browse The Internet, how to open an email account, and how to write a                   
CV. Users were not included in the planning of these workshops, as it was rather a broad                 
introduction to how to use computers.  
Rosette pointed out that students and users cannot use the facilities at any time. They are                
welcome to participate in the no-cost programs that are coordinated and planned by the staff, or                
that they can apply to use the facilities if they have a relevant ongoing visual project. This aspect                  
was challenging according to the coordinator, as it was difficult at the beginning to make a                
balance between the discourse of free services and skill training. Some citizens had the initial               
perception that they could go to the PVD Lab to check their emails, post on social media and                  
browse the web for any purpose. So efforts were not only made in training the community with                 
technical skills, but also promoting the idea that the services were for the benefit of the                
community rather than the individual. 
Students and users reacted and responded positively to the digital tools offered by the              
Lab, according to Rosette, as they valued the initiatives of fostering entrepreneurship and digital              
literacy. She exemplified this with a successful case of a group of students who created a digital                 
animation series called The City of Ghosts (La Ciudad de los Fantasmas, 2017), that was               
screened with video mapping techniques on the walls of heritage buildings in the city’s center.               
The creators behind the project were enrolled at the Film and Audiovisual Media program at the                
university. They had the theoretical knowledge for undertaking a project as such, but they were               
lacking the equipment for doing so. The coordinator explained that students applied for support              
from the PVD Lab, and were granted access to the facilities, which became their office while the                 
project was taking place. 
The Lab’s coordinator explained that there were no unexpected results of how ICTs were              
used and appropriated, as the goals were clearly defined from the start. However, she mentioned               
that unplanned situations happened during the execution of some of the projects. She underlined              
that the digital tools were not misused, but it was rather the human interaction that was                
sometimes troublesome. The leaders of some projects were giving improper use to the facilities,              
by working on different personal projects outside the agreements while outsourcing the obliged             
tasks. In order to stop this misuse, stricter guidelines were implemented. 
54 
 
Last, but not least, Rosette mentioned that the PVD Lab has been weathering political               
changes, bureaucratic problems and lack of budget. The center was originally requested by the              
Governor’s office to the central Government, and in this initial phase it was the latter who                
provided financial support for purchasing equipment and adapting infrastructure. After this, the            
local authorities were in charge of maintaining and funding the project, so adjustments based on               
political disagreements have threatened the original goals and intentions. For instance, Rosette            
explains that there are efforts to privatize the whole project, so that money could be charged in                 
order to generate income. She also expressed uncertainty when discussing the future of the              
project, as 2019 was an election year and new local Governments were going to start their term                 
in 2020. There was not a clear policy of how this particular project was going to keep operating                  
in the near future. 
Four former users who were working as interns were interviewed for this case study:              
Carolina Portela (Film student from Universidad del Magdalena), Lizeth Jiménez (Marketing           
student from Universidad del Magdalena), Yeraldin Queiroz (high school student), and Diego            
Jaimes (high school student). The conversation with them took place as a round table. They each                
described their roles and commented about the PVD Lab project. Carolina was in charge of               
creating visual content for promoting events and workshops, Lizeth’s task was to handle social              
networks, and Yeraldin and Diego were there to assist the facilitators of the workshops. The two                
high school students were getting trained so that they could work in the VD of their local                 
communities. 
They pointed out that the projects they were involved in were properly explained to them               
(both as users and interns). The goals and aims were clear and successfully shared with them, so                 
they knew from the beginning what to expect. However, they discussed that the planning process               
was not open to the community, but rather that the projects were contemplated and organized               
internally; as Jannia Rosette, the project manager, mentioned. They indicated that they were not              
familiar with the portfolio from where the activities were selected from, but that they chose the                
workshops that fitted better their interests. For example, Carolina Portela and Lizeth Jiménez             
participated in some editing and social media workshops that complemented their studies. These             
were merely technical, and there was no critical discussion about these tools. They indicated that               
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they did not use the digital tools for achieving other personal interests (outside the programs'               
goals). They explained that they perceived the workshops and the PVD Lab as a place for                




Jaime Rodríguez is an ICT manager working at the City Hall of Cali, where several PVD                
centers are still up and running. At the moment of the interview he was involved in the                 
restructuring of the project, as changes were requested from local authorities in response to the               
shifts in the Central Government. The PVD were even changing their names. No longer were               
they going to be called PVD but rather ​Punto de Apropiacion Digital (PAD) (Digital              
Appropriation Point in English). Rodríguez explained that changes on central policies gave more             
freedom to local authorities, but that also many of the centers were actually shutting down as                
they were no longer financially viable. He explained, however, that the centers in Cali are still                
referred to as PVD, as the locals were more familiar with the name. According to him, more                 
work and time was needed with the communities in order to socialize the new adjustments.  
The PVD located at the ​Tecnocentro Somos Pacífico ​was chosen as a topic of discussion               
during the interview. This is located in one of the city’s poorest sectors, and it was built with a                   
joint venture of public institutions and private. It houses different programs that seek to foster               
artistic skills within the community, such as dance, music, painting, theater, and training in              
digital tools. The PVD was introduced by central and local authorities in 2013, specifically with               
the goal of supporting such activities with the arts and digital literacy.  
However, the intention was not only to bridge the digital gap but also invisible social               
ones, as Rodríguez pointed out. According to him, this center is located in one area that suffers                 
from violence due to conflict between gangs. For this reason, social leaders are invited to meet                
the coordinators in order to plan activities and promote peacebuilding activities. The PVD is              
open to the endeavors that these leaders set, while the staff provides the technical knowledge of                
how to use the digital tools. The experience has proven to be successful and the community has                 
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changed its view of what public services mean. There is the common idea amongst locals that                
what is public has no owner, so there is no need for taking care of it or that damage can be done                      
with no further repercussions. The PVD has helped to change this idea. The community is taking                
good care of the center as it understands the valuable impact it has on society. Rodríguez                
explained that rival gang members have even worked in the same projects, and that together they                
peacefully ensure that no damage is given to the equipment nor the facilities. This PVD has                
strongly supported the creation of audiovisual content, as it was the case in Santa Marta.  
This PVD made alliances with universities and schools in order to train students with              
technical skills. Online material was offered to the ones who enrolled, and certificates were given               
after completion. These courses varied from computer programming to communication          
techniques, and coaching was given for those searching for jobs. Partnerships were also             
established with private companies, to urge the hiring of those who completed the courses. The               
community from this particular area has scarce access to education opportunities and many             
women under 20 years old are single mothers, as it was pointed out during the interview. This                 
PVD seeks to provide tools to tackle the challenges that this community faces, so programs are                
both targeted towards peacebuilding and gaining technical skills. 
Rodríguez mentioned that the social aspect prevailed over the technological one in this             
experience. There were no unexpected results of how ICTs were used and appropriated by the               
community as the goals and intentions were clearly fixed at the beginning. For him, and for the                 
staff working there, what was unforeseen was the social impact. The center had a special               
community approach since the outset, but it was surprising for the staff to see how eager the                 
users were to make use of the facilities and equipment. It has been rewarding for them to see                  
how ICTs were implemented based on the community’s need, rather than just introducing digital              
tools because of novelty or just for the sake of it. 
 
Digital Kiosk Mocagua - Amazonas  
The Mocagua community is an indigenous reservation located on the shores of the             
Amazon river, two hours upstream from Leticia (the largest city in the area). It is composed by                 
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members of the Ticuna tribe, and no more than 300 families live there. This place has been                 
historically neglected by central authorities, and there is a lack of public services and state               
support. The economy is based on ecotourism, activity that has grown in the last couple of years.                 
The increase in foreigners visiting the country is a result of the Peace Agreement, as more                
people have been attracted to visit Colombia (El Tiempo, 2019). A smaller version of a PVD                
called Kiosko Digital (KD) (Digital Kiosk) was provided to the community by the Central              
Government during the second phase (2014-2018). Computers and internet access free of charge             
were installed inside the school premises. 
Nelson Lemus was the KD coordinator during 2018 until August 2019. He explained             
during the interview that the original intention from this specific point was to grant Internet               
connection to a community that was completely disconnected from the online world, and to              
deliver training in how to use the new digital tools. The intention was not to foster the creation of                   
content or encourage entrepreneurship. Professionals in ICTs visited the community to facilitate            
workshops with the goal of instructing locals on how to run the project by themselves and take                 
care of the equipment. According to Lemus this proved to be successful, as adult and young                
students started to browse the web to acquire new knowledge.  
He pointed out that users were not necessarily included during the planning process, as              
the project’s layout was brought from the capital. The guidelines were initially designed without              
the input of the community. However, this did not mean that local social dynamics were               
completely ignored. The KD coordinator underlined that users requested more detailed programs            
as soon as they saw the opportunities the digital tools brought. The most notorious case was the                 
raising interest on how to use ICTs to boost the tourism industry. Locals learned how to open                 
accounts on social media and services such as booking.com in order to promote hotels and travel                
plans. This even caught the attention of tourist companies based in Bogotá and alliances between               
them were made. According to Lemus this was a surprising outcome, as promoting tourism was               
not one of the initial goals.  
The KD in Mocagua had a major difference from the PVDs in Cali and Santa Marta: the                 
strong dependence on the Central Government. Local authorities in the two latter cases had more               
financial and political independence for sustaining and coordinating the PVDs. This was not the              
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case in Mocagua, so the project did not survive the changes in central policies from 2018. This                 
brought frustration to the community, as Lemus explained. According to him, no central             
authority gave any type of reason explaining why the program was being cancelled. They were               
just notified that from a certain date the Internet access was going to be cut off. 
 
Linternet 
Linternet ​is a Colombian project that started running in 2011 under the direction of              
Camilo Herrera. The project was dubbed ‘A Liter of Light’ by that time, as the initial goal was to                   
provide lighting in communities that were not fully connected to the country’s energy network.              
Herrera explained during the interview that on the early stage they provided homemade ‘bulbs’              
made with used plastic bottles filled with water and chlorine. These ‘bulbs’ used the physical               
laws of refraction to increase the scope of the rays of light, but it was a method that had many                    
flaws. These did not produce light, but rather they tried to redistribute light from other sources                
(like the sun or electric bulbs). Solar energy panels that powered street lighting posts were               
introduced in 2014 in order to fix this problem. 
Herrera noticed one interesting phenomenon while he visited different communities while           
installing ‘A Liter of Light’. According to him, poor families in the country owned smartphones               
even though they lacked toilets or even proper floors in their households. However, there was no                
data coverage on their surrounding area, so the fact of holding smartphones may have not seem                
useful. Nevertheless, he mentioned that having smartphones was a matter of prestige, of social              
recognition and status. Herrera and his team identified this, so they realized that the communities               
could benefit from a Wifi signal. For this reason, they started to install Wifi replicators on the                 
light posts in 2016, so the project kept the initial goal of providing lighting with the addition of                  
internet connectivity. The project was called Linternet from there on (a combination of the words               
lantern and internet in Spanish). The Linternet team formed an alliance with the PVD program in                
order to use the internet infrastructure that the Government had already installed in remote              
regions. The communities already had access to internet and computers inside the PVD, but              
connectivity to a wireless network was a complement provided by Linternet. In some places a               
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modest sum of money was charged per minute of Wifi access, which was not disruptive because                
a small fee for using the computers within the PVD centers was already charged in some cases. 
According to Herrera the process for implementing the project has three main steps. The              
first one is to invite members of the community to engage during the construction and               
installation of the light posts with the Wifi replicators. The users are included during the               
construction process, which results in creating a sense of appropriation within the locals. After              
this, during the second step, the community is trained on the maintenance of the light posts, to                 
avoid the dependence of external people if something goes wrong with the equipment. Herrera              
pointed out that Linternet is not only a project that brings Wifi connectivity, but it also provides                 
workshops about how to use the digital tools. In this third step ‘Light ambassadors’ visit               
communities and facilitate workshops that teach how to browse the web and access services.              
They even provide free online courses in topics like personal finance and accounting. The first               
and second step are focused on constructing and preserving the infrastructure with the help of the                
community, whereas the third step is centered on the usage of the newly introduced digital tools.  
Herrera’s team initially thought that locals within these communities were going to use             
the Internet to learn new skills, communicate with others, increase their network, and share              
personal projects. This is something that actually happens, but not to the desired extent. Locals               
are browsing mainly YouTube, other social networks and pornography. Herrera underlined that            
Linternet makes efforts to improve the Wifi infrastructure and facilitated workshops for using             
digital tools to overcome poverty, but at the end the user is free to browse whatever he or she                   
wants (as they are paying for the service). Herrera explained that this situation and outcome is                
frustrating, because the bigger picture is not only to provide access to technology, but also to                
change behaviors. Nevertheless, this issue is not something that is stopping them from keeping              
working and reaching more communities, as they constantly strive to bring lighting and wireless              
connectivity to the periphery. 
Herrera and his team won a grant from Google in 2017 to implement the Linternet project                
in over one hundred communities across the country. Places with extreme poverty situations that              
were affected by the internal conflict were selected during this phase. Linternet, as Herrera              
pointed out during the interview, wanted to support communities in a post-conflict scenario and              
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back peacebuilding initiatives and efforts. They managed to bring lighting and wifi connectivity             
to places as such, following the same principles of community work and using the infrastructure               
from the PVD. However, as it was mentioned earlier, many PVD are currently shutting down as                
a result of policy changes from the central government. Linternet cannot replicate the signal that               
was coming into the PVD any longer, so they are making alliances with private companies at this                 
point. Their idea is to keep connecting these communities with private internet providers that              






















7. Analysis and presentation of findings 
 
The previous Colombian case studies present two approaches on how ICTs were            
introduced in rural communities. These have certain similarities, for example: they had a strong              
belief that technology would foster development, and they both strove to work with rural              
communities in peacebuilding. There are also significant differences between the two, apart from             
the fact that VD was originally a State-run project whereas Linternet is a non-governmental              
venture. This chapter examines these two programs with a critical perspective to understand their              
similarities and differences, and to analyze their levels of success or failure. In order to achieve                
this, each project is first studied individually. Each is contrasted against other case studies that               
were earlier described, and ideas and concepts that were introduced in the Literature Review              
chapter are applied and discussed. Then, the points in common and distinct characteristics of the               
projects in Colombia are discussed. The intention is not to claim that one project is superior to                 
the other, or even suggest that one should copy the other’s model. The goal is, to have a critical                   
view and contribute with ideas and suggestions that could improve the projects. The analysis will               
first addressVD, followed by Linternet.  
The VD project was strongly tied to a political project. It was not innovative from this                
perspective, as it used the same rhetoric as other governments. It was based on a technological                
determinist approach, which considered that technology would solve social problems and           
produce only positive outcomes. It was ambitious with the goal of narrowing the digital gap,               
improving the country's network, strengthening democracy and the digital government, and           
encouraging the development of applications that would have helped the poor. The project             
promised to provide technology in the life of every Colombian in order to close the social gap,                 
just as the slogan stated. However, there was no critical perspective of how the new digital tools                 
could have a negative impact upon culture by creating new problems and new dependencies.  
The Colombian Government had similar aims and goals as in other projects that are              
described in this research, especially with the Minitel, e-Estonia, and Cybersin. These three             
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projects had a political backdrop that perceived technology as a tool for solving social problems               
of the time, and VD is no different in this sense. The French government pursued a technological                 
revolution that benefited thousands of citizens by providing networks and terminals, and it             
created the electronic platform for accessing and offering digital services. The Estonian state             
sought to open up and modernize the country, and it encouraged the expansion of the Internet                
under a liberal market. Salvador Allende dreamt to build a more efficient and transparent state               
with the use of electronic terminals and networks that would have fostered social development.              
The four projects in these countries had similar intentions, but the ones in France, Estonia and                
Chile were more ambitious when it came to executing the plan. The technological solutions that               
they sought to create were innovative at the time, and they promoted internal expertise in order                
to deliver the products. The French government encouraged local industry for manufacturing the             
Minitel terminals, as well as computer scientists to develop the digital services. The Estonian              
government used the existing computing expertise in order to build efficient digital services, and              
it keeps doing it with groundbreaking projects such as the Data Embassies. Chile’s socialist              
government wanted to put the Cybersin project in place despite the financial blockade. British              
and Chilean scientists worked together, and they exchanged knowledge in order to come with              
solutions to address the lack of computing power that was available. These were ultimately              
projects that sought to strengthen the concept of the nation state, and they intended to promote                
national industry and expertise. The VD project was not innovative in this sense, as there was no                 
goal of manufacturing technological solutions internally. It was more a matter of expanding the              
network infrastructure and endowing centers with computing devices. There was no reflection            
about how local expertise could enhance the technological solutions that were going to be              
introduced. 
The fact that all these projects were based on a political agenda opens a question                
regarding their life span: Can state-run technology programs weather political shifts? The answer             
to this question differs based on the context. The Minitel ran for over thirty years, the efforts of                  
making Estonia a digital forerunner are still ongoing after their liberation in 1991, and Cybersin               
never saw the light of day after the military coup. Some projects became part of state policies                 
that continued despite governmental changes, and modifications and changes were implemented           
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over time. After describing the current state of VD it is possible to point out that the project did                   
not endure the political changes, especially in a context of strong internal division due to the way                 
the Peace Agreement was negotiated and implemented. This is precisely one of the biggest flaws               
from this particular project. It did not take into account the fact that power structures change over                 
time when making ambitious promises regarding technology. It was a program that was planned              
and designed by a government for a specific period of time, and funds were only secured for a                  
couple of months after the presidential term was over. It was not a project that promoted                
structural changes from the base, on how to strengthen ICTs state-policies regardless of the              
ruling party. The project lacked a critical perspective regarding the time frames. The             
Technoscience ideas dive precisely into this, by recognizing that the relationship between            
technology and society is never static, and that it changes over time. The VD project was not                 
transparent about its lifespan. It is easy to argue that the project was ultimately shut down by the                  
new incoming government, but this is not entirely true. The project could have added more               
critical perspectives regarding its goals not only in space (reaching rural areas) but also in time.                
For example, by having clear methods for testing and updating the digital tools over a period of                 
time.  
Approaching ICTs projects as long-term state policies instead of governmental policies            
can create a precedent in the way technology and society are discussed in political debates. The                
former refer to policies that must be kept regarding the ruling party and that are included in a                  
constitution, whereas the latter are policies that come and go depending on the result of elections.                
It may be indeed a very optimistic suggestion but confronting these issues as such can strengthen                
the ICTs projects into the future; instead of “reinventing” them under every presidential term.              
Not having a long-term discussion ignores that these types of projects deal not only with               
machines and wires, but also with humans. The changes of ICTs programs have more impact on                
the people using them than on the machines. Budget and equipment can be repurposed in a                
relatively short amount of time but working with communities requires a longer period of time.               
The project managers that were interviewed for this research expressed that the uncertainty of              
VD’s future proves to be a challenge. It was painstaking for them to build trust with the                 
communities and explain the reach and goals of the projects. This is a process that has to start all                   
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over again as completely new policies and strategies are introduced, creating a burden on those               
working in the programs. 
One other element that the projects in France, Estonia and Chile had in common was the                
pursuit of independence: Minitel from IBM and foreign companies, e-Estonia from the legacy of              
the former Soviet Union, and Cybersin from strictly capitalist and communist economic and             
social models. It is true that VD did not use technology for ideologies as such, nor issues about                  
autonomy were brought to the fore. However, topics about freedom and reliance can be actually               
discussed within VD, in order to address the project’s dependence on social networks. One of the                
biggest flaws from the VD program was that the final products were not stored in a platform or                  
archive that would give account of the processes and results. The project managers that were               
interviewed for this research pointed to social media (mainly YouTube and Facebook) when             
asked about the results from workshops and activities. However, these social media are not              
meant to work as archives, as they aim to constantly feed new information based on their internal                 
protocols and algorithms. It proved difficult to retrieve information about specific projects during             
the interviews, as there was no system in place for this purpose (other than scrolling down                
through old posts on social media).  
This also limited the circulation of the aesthetic practices within the rules of social media.               
The ones that were not shared online are currently stored in drives, away from public eyes. This                 
is due, as the project managers pointed out, to legal restrictions and the lack of permits. It is true                   
that PVD centers were fostering aesthetical practices of rural communities in Colombia,            
specially focused on visual productions. Qualified professionals were training users with modern            
equipment and digital tools. However, the project lacked planning on the distribution phase. One              
possible solution would be to develop a platform for showcasing all the projects or promoting               
festivals or activities where creators could participate. The creators' roles ran short within VD, as               
there was no further environment or incentive to share the processes and results. The Finnish               
case study sets an example of a different approach, as the welfare state unrolled the Tekes and                 




This also poses a big problem for the peacebuilding initiatives, that are nowhere to be               
seen. The fact that projects within the VD had no follow-up and no further distribution has made                 
that results fall into oblivion, especially when it comes to projects related to peace initiatives.               
Nicolás Llano, former director for VDR, suggested that is partly due to the approach the new                
government is giving to the discourse about Peace. This is a result, also as explained before,                
from having a techno deterministic approach towards technology. One government believes that            
technology can strengthen democracy through peacebuilding developments, while the next one           
shuts off the switch as it believes that technology can strengthen democracy through innovation.  
The main goal of the PVD centers in Santa Marta and Cali is to foster visual and creative                  
productions, whereas the DK in Mocagua had the purpose of providing internet connectivity.             
The project managers pointed out that efforts had to be made in order to clarify to members of                  
the community that the new centers were not intended to be internet cafes (at least in Santa                 
Marta and Cali). It was explained to the users that the centers were there to support local artistic                  
and visual projects and were not available for just sitting and going through emails or social                
media. However, some workshops trained users on how to open email and social media              
accounts, without critically thinking what challenges and problems could arise from them            
providing personal data (especially when it came to communities under vulnerable conditions).            
Digital literacy was not fully covered during the planning and implementation phases of the              
projects, and there was not a program that followed-up how users kept using the digital tools                
after the workshops were over. The VD program was not only very dependent on social media                
for showcasing the projects, but that it also created dependence for users. Social media was not at                 
the service of VD, but it was rather VD that worked under their protocols and algorithms. 
Linternet had two main phases. The initial one that sought to provide public lighting, and               
the second one (which is still up and running) that introduced Wifi connectivity by combining               
streetlight poles and land networks. The project’s discourse exalts social transformation through            
technology. It describes the importance of working directly with communities, and in training             
locals on how to build and maintain the poles and wi-fi stations. The poles are actually built with                  
materials found on the spot, only the wi-fi hardware and the solar panels are brought by the                 
Linternet team (which are actually the most important components). This workflow requires            
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local participation, similar (to some extent) to the idea behind the French government that              
pushed for national innovation with the Minitel. Linternet does not have the budget or reach to                
sustain a country wide project such as the Minitel terminals and network, but it recognized that                
local expertise had to be put in place somehow when building and developing the infrastructure.               
It is not a matter of how local computer scientists and network experts can come with solutions                 
(as in France), but more on how local knowledge can be used to build infrastructure with scarce                 
materials. This characteristic may approach Linternet to Cybersin, again to some extent, as both              
had to find solutions based on a lack of equipment and infrastructure. The aim of Linterent was                 
not to create dependency on external expertise when fixes needed to be put in place (as in France                  
and Chile), but rather to train locals on how to solve problems and challenges independently.               
According to Camilo Herrera, Linternet’s director, this has been a good decision because locals              
take better care of the poles. However, there is no information or case studies that explain how                 
local fixes take place, or if some light poles are currently not working due to the lack of                  
maintenance. It is not entirely clear how locals can fix problems when it comes to the solar                 
panels and wi-fi routers, or if these are renewed after a certain time.  
Linternet encourages business-oriented training by providing short courses on          
microfinance and entrepreneurship. Their aim is also to train locals on how to use the digital                
tools for improving performance on economic activities. The intention is not to stimulate             
aesthetic practices or creativity, but rather productivity. The Linternet team works with local             
communities to identify local ways of production in order to integrate digital tools to the               
workflow. However, it is not clear how the outcome of the training is measured. Linternet's team                
is able to quantify the number of users who access and finish the courses, but the impact of these                   
upon the community is still vague. This poses a certain similarity with the OLPC project in                
Paraguay, where it was not clear how the laptops could be integrated with already ongoing               
activities (teachers were not certain how to apply the machines into their workflow).  
During the interview Camilo Herrera mentioned that Linternet’s task was to deliver            
infrastructure and network, and not to address cultural aspects of how the technology is used or                
resistance. The project lacks a thorough understanding of technology by choosing not to dive              
into cultural discussions. Linternet has a positive approach towards technology, as the other case              
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studies, but it lacks a more critical approach towards technology and society. The project has               
indeed narrowed the digital gap by connecting communities in the periphery that were             
historically neglected by the center, as the interview with Herrera suggests. But the project can               
gain even more relevance and strength if cultural aspects are introduced into the workflow. It is                
not only a matter of providing access to networks or training on productivity, but on analyzing                
the cultural aspects that are amplified or modified by the digital tools that are introduced.               
Understanding this can be useful for the project, as new approaches can be tested by balancing                
the analysis of technology and society.  
One of the most relevant characteristics from the Minitel and the Cybersin cases was the               
research that was carried out in the first place. The report, that the president ​Valery Giscard                
d’Estaing ​ordered Nora and Minc to write, analyzed the current situation regarding technology             
and society in France. Fernando Flores and Stafford Beer analyzed cybernetics concepts within             
the Chilean case in the first place, in order to come up with the best possible way to introduce                   
new ideas and procedures in the South American country. Research was also the base of               
technological development in Finland, that can be traced back to the investments made by the               
government for improving technical education at university level. There is a lack of such              
analysis and research within the Colombian case studies. This could be partly due to the lack of                 
personnel and the need to quantify results as fast as possible in order to justify the investments.                 
These matters can be improved by creating research grants for supporting long term projects on a                
state level. There is, as explained before, funding that is given by international development              
agencies or internet giants such as Google, but there is still a lack of strong national policies for                  
supporting local development in the long run. Local research can help to address ideas such as                
the ‘technological reconstruction’ (Bauchspies, Croissant and Restivo, 2006, 82) and          
‘technological intensification’ (83) 
Both VD and Linternet aimed to work with communities that were affected by the war.               
These intended to bridge the digital gap, create new job and education opportunities, and develop               
solutions for peacebuilding purposes. However, these two did not consider thoroughly how new             
structures of power and protocols could have cultural impacts, as Johan Galtung discusses. New              
dependencies were introduced by social media. Unintended use of the digital tools came to place               
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when users were able to pay for Internet connection, as the spike in porn consumption that                
Camilo Herrera pointed out. Users in rural communities create the same dependencies in digital              
platforms as the ones in urban areas. Locals have become experts in using social networks such                
as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, and they follow the same affordances of like              
buttons and sharing options. Users provide data and create and share content regardless if they               
are in the center or periphery. Technology did not intensify peacebuilding, democracy or             
aesthetic practices. The way both projects trusted technology did not allow a critical thinking of               
how tools could intensify processes as such. Fostering peacebuilding, democracy and aesthetic            





















Connecting rural areas of Colombia has not been a consolidated State policy, but rather it               
has become a matter of projects that one government defends and the next shuts down. There has                 
not been a clear long-term strategy for narrowing the digital gap, but rather short-term initiatives               
that fade every four years. Efforts made by NGOs and private organizations exist longer in time,                
as they do not strictly depend on decisions made by politicians. These face financial challenges               
as they are reliant on grants and financial aid from international companies or development              
funds. Nevertheless, the projects (regardless of who runs them) that aim to connect remote areas               
to the Internet and foster development, aesthetical practices and peacebuilding have a strong             
technological deterministic approach. These perceive technology as the key for solving social            
issues, which has proven not to be successful.  
The research presented in this thesis suggests that ICTs projects in Colombia lack a              
critical perspective about technology. Ideas that begin during planning phases tend to be             
overwhelmingly positive and are not contested. Potential problems and challenges from           
introducing digital tools are not seen. There is a blind faith that technology will foster social                
transformation, and the success of the programs are not visibly measured.  
The present times of COVID-19 have stripped away the illusion that the digital gap has               
been successfully narrowed, and that social transformation is taking place through technology.            
The pandemic has made evident the inequality in connectivity in Colombia. Citizens with more              
resources are more likely to withstand the present situation by using digital tools. Some can still                
work, learn from home, and access different digital services. Whereas the ones that are              
disconnected do not have the same opportunities. The country is not equally connected after              
years of programs and projects that keep insisting that technology will transform society. The              
lack of critical perspective and understanding from the relationship between technology and            
society have kept the digital gap to endure, despite years of effort. After all, some have the                 
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